Monday, June 20, 2011

Ground-breaking U.S. Supreme Court Decision on 9th & 10th Amendments

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court issued one of the best and most important decisions ever on federalism.  The Court unanimously held that not just states but individuals have standing to challenge federal laws as violations of state sovereignty under the 10th Amendment. This decision is as radical in the direction of liberty as the New Deal was radical in the direction of socialism;

Wednesday, April 27, 2011

NY Bar Resolution 2006 - A Civil Gideon Right

Toward a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases in New York State: A Report of the New York State Bar Association

Laura Abel

Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 32-70, 2009

NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-11


The New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) and 11 other bar associations co-sponsored a 2006 American Bar Association (ABA) resolution that urged federal and state jurisdictions to establish a right to counsel in civil cases concerning basic human needs. This report compares the scope of the existing right to counsel in New York State to the five categories of basic human needs cases identified by the ABA: Cases concerning shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody. It also assesses the existing right to counsel in cases concerning members of special or vulnerable populations, and in cases involving deprivation of physical liberty. It also suggests areas for expansion of the right, particularly regarding cases concerning evictions, foreclosures, and unemployment insurance appeals.

The Creation of the Access to Justice Program / 1998

Access to Justice Program: Report 2010

Justice Fern Fisher: Closing Statements on "Access to Justice Program" 2010's%20Testimony.pdf

NYS Bar Ass. Committee on Legal Aid: Report on Assigned Counsel in Civil Cases 1981

Massachusetts Takes Steps Towards a Civil Gideon

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Fudiciary Duty

The fiduciary relationship of partners is discussed in 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 420 (1987):

The courts universally recognize the fiduciary relationship of partners and impose on them obligations of the utmost good faith and integrity in their dealings with one another in partnership affairs. It is a fundamental characteristic of partnership that the partners’ relationship is one of trust and confidence when dealing with each other in partnership matters.

Partners are held to a standard stricter than the morals of the marketplace, and their fiduciary duties should be broadly construed, connoting not mere honesty but the punctilio of honor most sensitive. In all matters connected with the partnership every partner is bound to act in a manner not to obtain any advantage over his copartner in the partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind. A partner cannot act too quickly to protect his own financial position at the expense of his partners, even in the absence of malice

Monday, April 18, 2011

Jubic v. Jubic, et. al., Continued on Appeal


Appellant George J. Jubic (aka George M. Jubic, Jr.) and Respondent Robert Jubic are brothers . In 1988, their father, Mr. George M. Jubic, deeded a certain parcel of land to them, located at 19 Cross St. in the City of Troy, County of Rensselaer, NY. The property was deeded to the brothers on the condition they create a general partnership for the purpose of constructing a multi-unit apartment building upon it whereby the brothers could derive income “for life” from rental income and at the same time grant a life-estate to the elderly parents in one of the units.

The agreement was for the two brothers to construct the building themselves all the while acting as equal partners, sharing jointly and equally in all liabilities and assets.

At the time of the signing over of the deed, Respondent Robert Jubic bought with him a close personal friend of his and partner in other real-estate ventures, (Respondent) Robert McAllister. Respondent Robert Jubic insisted that (Respondent) McAllister’s name be added onto the deed as a full 1/3 partner. Over objections, at Respondent Robert Jubics insistence, (Respondent) Robert McAllister’s name was added to the deed as a full 1/3 partner.
(See deed attached as Ex. ___________. Note Appellants aka name on deed as George M. Jubic, Jr.)

On 1/30/90, the three partners took out a joint loan together from the Troy Savings Bank, the funds to be used for construction materials. (See Troy Savings Bank loan, Ex________.)

The three partners worked side by side through all stages of the construction process, and by the end of 1993 the first of five units was completed and rented out. By 1995 all five units were completed and occupied, four being rented out and one given to the elderly Jubic parents as a life estate.

Respondent Robert Jubic was the self-appointed book-keeper of all the partnership affairs, and took care of all the accounts payable and receivable for the venture. As a partner and family member, Appellant trusted and put full faith and credit in his brother Roberts honesty and integrity to act as a fiduciary for his partnership interests, and trusted that he would be notified, as promised,.. when the venture started making profits.

From the years of construction to about 1999, Appellant preformed general maintenance duties on the property such as lawn and yard work, trash disposal, clean up of apartments in-between rentals, and other repairs in general.

In the year 2000, based on information provided by certain family members, appellant became aware that the joint loan taken out in 1990 from the Troy Savings Bank for construction of the apartment building had been fully satisfied on 5/31/96, leading Appellant to believe that the partnership property was indeed realizing profits. Appellant was never informed that this loan had been satisfied. (See Satisfaction of Mortgage attached as Ex. ______________.)

After this discovery Appellant hired attorney James L. Coffin to represent his interest in the partnership. Mr. Coffin tried unsuccessfully to resolve the issue informally but to no avail. (See “demand” letter attached as Ex.________.) When he requested an accounting he was provided with a spread sheet that indicated that Appellant George J. Jubic was indeed listed as 1/3rd partner and that his 1/3rd portion of the debt for the Troy Savings Bank loan had been paid out of partnership earnings. (See spreadsheet attached as Ex._______.) It is also stated on this spreadsheet that, from the year 1990 to 2004, the venture grossed nearly $300,000. It was also discovered upon review of this spreadsheet that the Respondents claimed “additional loans” were taken out “as against” the partnership property, of which Appellant had no knowledge of and was not a party to. However, a search of the clerks office in 2004 showed no liens were levied against the partnership property, a fact the partners could not satisfactorily explain.

In view of the failure to informally resolve the issue of the true and exact financial affairs of the partnership,….appellant was forced to file suit.


On Aug. 4, 2005, by and through his attorney James L. Coffin, a lawsuit was filed against the partners in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for Rensselaer Co. (Acting Supreme Court Judge Hon. Christian Hummel, Case # 214005) said lawsuit asking for an accounting, dissolution of partnership and partition of partnership property with appointment of receiver, and alleging several and various other causes of action including Breech of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Conversion and Unjust enrichment.

(See copy of complaint attached as Ex.______________.)

The parties entered into the discovery process whereby Respondants made the first demands and Appellant fully complied. However, Respondants failed to comply with any portion of appellants discovery requests and a moton to compell production was made and granted (See Order to Produce attached as Ex.________.) Despite the Order, Respondants failed to produce any of the documents requested by appellant and a Order of Preclusion was asked for and issued (See Order of Preclusion Ex._______.)

On or about Dec. 10, 2006, a pre-trial conference was schedualed but it was at this time that appellants counsel was nowhere to be found. A call to the NYS Bar Association was made in efforts to acertain the whereabouts of Mr. Coffin and it was discovered that he had been permanently barred from practicing law in the state of New York for matters unrelated to this case, and he was in fact at that time in prison for mis-use of another clients funds.


(To be continued)

Monday, March 7, 2011

Motion for Extention of Time to Perfect Appeal


George J. Jubic, (aka George M. Jubic, Jr.),
Plaintiff, Pro Se

V. Notice of Motion

Robert Jubic and Robert McAllister, For Extension of Time
Defendants, To Submit Appeal



To: Clerk

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT I, George J. Jubic, the Plaintiff in the above mentioned case, based on the annexed affidavit, will move this court on the __________day of March, 2011, for an Order of the Court granting me permission for an extension of time to submit appeal.

Replies in opposition, if any, should be submitted no later than 3 days prior to the return date of this motion.

Dated: ___________________ _____________________________________
George J. Jubic
118 River Rd. 2nd Fl.
Johnsonville, NY 12094
(518) 753 - 7791


Michael P. Mansion, Attorney for Defendants
1528 Central Ave.
Albany, NY 12205

Rensselaer County Attorney
County Office Bldg.
Troy, NY 12180


George J. Jubic, (aka George M. Jubic, Jr.),
Plaintiff, Pro Se

V. Affidavit in Support Robert Jubic and Robert McAllister,
Case #__________________

State of New York
County of Rensselaer;

I George J. Jubic, the Plaintiff / Appellant in the above mentioned matter, do

hereby swear under threat of penalty for perjury, that;

1. I did on the 2nd day of June, 2010, duly file a Notice of Appeal with the

Clerk of the Court for the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Rensselaer Co.,

as well as a copy to this Court sent that same day, in the matter of the lower court

case # 214085.

2. On the 28th day of June, 2010, along with an affidavit of indigency , I did

submit to this court an Application for permission to proceed on appeal as a poor

person for the purposes of waiving the costs, fees and expenses necessary to perfect


3. By Order of this court dated September 13th, 2010, Motion was denied in part

and granted in part, requiring me to provide for myself a copy of the trial

transcripts of the lower court proceedings of which is the basis for this appeal,

but granting at the same time a waiver of the filing fees as required by CPLR 8022.

4. Being that it took a matter of several months before I was able to afford

and obtain a copy of said transcripts, and being also that I work full time and am

not able to devote as much time to the perfection of my appeal as I would like, I

submit this affidavit in hopes that the court will grant me a 30 day extension of

time in which to submit my appeal.

WHEREFORE I respectfully pray this Court to grant the relief requested in

this Motion and Affidavit, and for any other such further relief as the court may

deem just and fair.

In lieu of Notary, I do herein swear under threat of penalty for perjury, that the

aforementioned facts as set forth above are true and correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief.

Dated: ___________________ _____________________________________
George J. Jubic
118 River Rd. 2nd Fl.
Johnsonville, NY 12094
(518) 753 - 7791


Michael P. Mansion, Attorney for Defendants
1528 Central Ave.
Albany, NY 12205

Rensselaer County Attorney
County Office Bldg.
Troy, NY 12180

Affidavit of Service, etc. etc.

Monday, January 17, 2011

Fla's Open Govt Sunset Review Act

Fla. Sunshine Laws / Exemptions

Fla. Commission on Open Government

How to Appeal a Denial of Records Requested Under Florida's Sunshine Laws

Florida's Sunshine Laws

Exemptions, Costs, Time Limitations

PUBLIC RECORDS View Entire Chapter

119.07 Inspection and copying of records; photographing public records; fees; exemptions.--

(1)(a) Every person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by any person desiring to do so, at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the public records.

(b) A custodian of public records or a person having custody of public records may designate another officer or employee of the agency to permit the inspection and copying of public records, but must disclose the identity of the designee to the person requesting to inspect or copy public records.

(c) A custodian of public records and his or her designee must acknowledge requests to inspect or copy records promptly and respond to such requests in good faith. A good faith response includes making reasonable efforts to determine from other officers or employees within the agency whether such a record exists and, if so, the location at which the record can be accessed.

(d) A person who has custody of a public record who asserts that an exemption applies to a part of such record shall redact that portion of the record to which an exemption has been asserted and validly applies, and such person shall produce the remainder of such record for inspection and copying.

(e) If the person who has custody of a public record contends that all or part of the record is exempt from inspection and copying, he or she shall state the basis of the exemption that he or she contends is applicable to the record, including the statutory citation to an exemption created or afforded by statute.

(f) If requested by the person seeking to inspect or copy the record, the custodian of public records shall state in writing and with particularity the reasons for the conclusion that the record is exempt or confidential.

(g) In any civil action in which an exemption to this section is asserted, if the exemption is alleged to exist under or by virtue of s. 119.071(1)(d) or (f), (2)(d),(e), or (f), or (4)(c), the public record or part thereof in question shall be submitted to the court for an inspection in camera. If an exemption is alleged to exist under or by virtue of s. 119.071(2)(c), an inspection in camera is discretionary with the court. If the court finds that the asserted exemption is not applicable, it shall order the public record or part thereof in question to be immediately produced for inspection or copying as requested by the person seeking such access.

(h) Even if an assertion is made by the custodian of public records that a requested record is not a public record subject to public inspection or copying under this subsection, the requested record shall, nevertheless, not be disposed of for a period of 30 days after the date on which a written request to inspect or copy the record was served on or otherwise made to the custodian of public records by the person seeking access to the record. If a civil action is instituted within the 30-day period to enforce the provisions of this section with respect to the requested record, the custodian of public records may not dispose of the record except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction after notice to all affected parties.

(i) The absence of a civil action instituted for the purpose stated in paragraph (g) does not relieve the custodian of public records of the duty to maintain the record as a public record if the record is in fact a public record subject to public inspection and copying under this subsection and does not otherwise excuse or exonerate the custodian of public records from any unauthorized or unlawful disposition of such record.

(2)(a) As an additional means of inspecting or copying public records, a custodian of public records may provide access to public records by remote electronic means, provided exempt or confidential information is not disclosed.

(b) The custodian of public records shall provide safeguards to protect the contents of public records from unauthorized remote electronic access or alteration and to prevent the disclosure or modification of those portions of public records which are exempt or confidential from subsection (1) or s. 24, Art. I of the State Constitution.

(c) Unless otherwise required by law, the custodian of public records may charge a fee for remote electronic access, granted under a contractual arrangement with a user, which fee may include the direct and indirect costs of providing such access. Fees for remote electronic access provided to the general public shall be in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(3)(a) Any person shall have the right of access to public records for the purpose of making photographs of the record while such record is in the possession, custody, and control of the custodian of public records.

(b) This subsection applies to the making of photographs in the conventional sense by use of a camera device to capture images of public records but excludes the duplication of microfilm in the possession of the clerk of the circuit court where a copy of the microfilm may be made available by the clerk.

(c) Photographing public records shall be done under the supervision of the custodian of public records, who may adopt and enforce reasonable rules governing the photographing of such records.

(d) Photographing of public records shall be done in the room where the public records are kept. If, in the judgment of the custodian of public records, this is impossible or impracticable, photographing shall be done in another room or place, as nearly adjacent as possible to the room where the public records are kept, to be determined by the custodian of public records. Where provision of another room or place for photographing is required, the expense of providing the same shall be paid by the person desiring to photograph the public record pursuant to paragraph (4)(e).

(4) The custodian of public records shall furnish a copy or a certified copy of the record upon payment of the fee prescribed by law. If a fee is not prescribed by law, the following fees are authorized:

(a)1. Up to 15 cents per one-sided copy for duplicated copies of not more than 14 inches by 81/2 inches;

2. No more than an additional 5 cents for each two-sided copy; and

3. For all other copies, the actual cost of duplication of the public record.

(b) The charge for copies of county maps or aerial photographs supplied by county constitutional officers may also include a reasonable charge for the labor and overhead associated with their duplication.

(c) An agency may charge up to $1 per copy for a certified copy of a public record.

(d) If the nature or volume of public records requested to be inspected or copied pursuant to this subsection is such as to require extensive use of information technology resources or extensive clerical or supervisory assistance by personnel of the agency involved, or both, the agency may charge, in addition to the actual cost of duplication, a special service charge, which shall be reasonable and shall be based on the cost incurred for such extensive use of information technology resources or the labor cost of the personnel providing the service that is actually incurred by the agency or attributable to the agency for the clerical and supervisory assistance required, or both.

(e)1. Where provision of another room or place is necessary to photograph public records, the expense of providing the same shall be paid by the person desiring to photograph the public records.

2. The custodian of public records may charge the person making the photographs for supervision services at a rate of compensation to be agreed upon by the person desiring to make the photographs and the custodian of public records. If they fail to agree as to the appropriate charge, the charge shall be determined by the custodian of public records.

(5) When ballots are produced under this section for inspection or examination, no persons other than the supervisor of elections or the supervisor's employees shall touch the ballots. If the ballots are being examined before the end of the contest period in s. 102.168, the supervisor of elections shall make a reasonable effort to notify all candidates by telephone or otherwise of the time and place of the inspection or examination. All such candidates, or their representatives, shall be allowed to be present during the inspection or examination.

(6) An exemption contained in this chapter or in any other general or special law shall not limit the access of the Auditor General, the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, or any state, county, municipal, university, board of community college, school district, or special district internal auditor to public records when such person states in writing that such records are needed for a properly authorized audit, examination, or investigation. Such person shall maintain the exempt or confidential status of that public record and shall be subject to the same penalties as the custodian of that record for public disclosure of such record.

(7) An exemption from this section does not imply an exemption from s. 286.011. The exemption from s. 286.011 must be expressly provided.

(8) The provisions of this section are not intended to expand or limit the provisions of Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the right and extent of discovery by the state or by a defendant in a criminal prosecution or in collateral postconviction proceedings. This section may not be used by any inmate as the basis for failing to timely litigate any postconviction action.
History.--s. 7, ch. 67-125; s. 4, ch. 75-225; s. 2, ch. 77-60; s. 2, ch. 77-75; s. 2, ch. 77-94; s. 2, ch. 77-156; s. 2, ch. 78-81; ss. 2, 4, 6, ch. 79-187; s. 2, ch. 80-273; s. 1, ch. 81-245; s. 1, ch. 82-95; s. 36, ch. 82-243; s. 6, ch. 83-215; s. 2, ch. 83-269; s. 1, ch. 83-286; s. 5, ch. 84-298; s. 1, ch. 85-18; s. 1, ch. 85-45; s. 1, ch. 85-73; s. 1, ch. 85-86; s. 7, ch. 85-152; s. 1, ch. 85-177; s. 4, ch. 85-301; s. 2, ch. 86-11; s. 1, ch. 86-21; s. 1, ch. 86-109; s. 2, ch. 87-399; s. 2, ch. 88-188; s. 1, ch. 88-384; s. 1, ch. 89-29; s. 7, ch. 89-55; s. 1, ch. 89-80; s. 1, ch. 89-275; s. 2, ch. 89-283; s. 2, ch. 89-350; s. 1, ch. 89-531; s. 1, ch. 90-43; s. 63, ch. 90-136; s. 2, ch. 90-196; s. 4, ch. 90-211; s. 24, ch. 90-306; ss. 22, 26, ch. 90-344; s. 116, ch. 90-360; s. 78, ch. 91-45; s. 11, ch. 91-57; s. 1, ch. 91-71; s. 1, ch. 91-96; s. 1, ch. 91-130; s. 1, ch. 91-149; s. 1, ch. 91-219; s. 1, ch. 91-288; ss. 43, 45, ch. 92-58; s. 90, ch. 92-152; s. 59, ch. 92-289; s. 217, ch. 92-303; s. 1, ch. 93-87; s. 2, ch. 93-232; s. 3, ch. 93-404; s. 4, ch. 93-405; s. 4, ch. 94-73; s. 1, ch. 94-128; s. 3, ch. 94-130; s. 67, ch. 94-164; s. 1, ch. 94-176; s. 1419, ch. 95-147; ss. 1, 3, ch. 95-170; s. 4, ch. 95-207; s. 1, ch. 95-320; ss. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, ch. 95-398; s. 1, ch. 95-399; s. 121, ch. 95-418; s. 3, ch. 96-178; s. 1, ch. 96-230; s. 5, ch. 96-268; s. 4, ch. 96-290; s. 41, ch. 96-406; s. 18, ch. 96-410; s. 1, ch. 97-185; s. 1, ch. 98-9; s. 7, ch. 98-137; s. 1, ch. 98-255; s. 1, ch. 98-259; s. 128, ch. 98-403; s. 2, ch. 99-201; s. 27, ch. 2000-164; s. 54, ch. 2000-349; s. 1, ch. 2001-87; s. 1, ch. 2001-108; s. 1, ch. 2001-249; s. 29, ch. 2001-261; s. 33, ch. 2001-266; s. 1, ch. 2001-364; s. 1, ch. 2002-67; ss. 1, 3, ch. 2002-257; s. 2, ch. 2002-391; s. 11, ch. 2003-1; s. 1, ch. 2003-100; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2003-110; s. 1, ch. 2003-137; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2003-157; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2004-9; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2004-32; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2004-62; ss. 1, 3, ch. 2004-95; s. 7, ch. 2004-335; ss. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, ch. 2005-251; s. 74, ch. 2005-277; s. 1, ch. 2007-39; ss. 2, 4, ch. 2007-251.

Friday, November 19, 2010

Silly Laws

Westchester, MA:Tightrope walking is illegal here unless you are in church.

Carmel, CA: It’s against the law for a woman to take a bath in a business office.

Lubbock, TX: It’s illegal to sleep in a garbage can.

Los Angeles, CA: It’s against the law to bathe two babies at the same time in the same tub.

Roanoke, VA: It’s illegal to advertise on tombstones.

South Bend, IN: It’s against the law to make a monkey smoke.

Oxford, OH: A woman may not remove her clothing while standing in front of a picture of a man.

Tennessee: It’s illegal to drive a care while you are asleep.

Wisconsin: It’s against the law to feed margarine instead of real butter to prisoners.

California: It’s illegal to peel an orange in your hotel room.

South Dakota: Don’t fall asleep in a cheese factory, or you could be arrested.

Garfield County, MT: It’s illegal to draw funny faces on window shades.

Kentucky: Anyone who comes face to face with a cow on the road, must remove their hat.

Hartford, CN: It’s illegal to walk across the street on your hands.

Hawaii: It’s illegal to put coins in your ears.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Tax Re-Accessment

Tax Benefits for Owning Real Estate

Traditional Benefit #3: Tax Benefits

The third Traditional Benefit that purchasing and owning real estate has offered is Tax Benefits. As Americans have purchased and owned real estate over the years they have been able to obtain substantial tax benefits. These tax benefits have resulted in property owners being able to put a lot more money in their pockets. How ? As a result of being able to deduct things like 1) mortgage interest, 2) property taxes, 3) depreciation, and 4) other miscellaneous types of deductions associated with real estate ownership property owners have been able to substantially increase the amount of tax refunds they’ve received from Uncle Sam. These increased tax refunds have not only increased Americans’ wealth but they have also positively stimulated the U. S. real estate market and overall economy as a result of these monies filtering into the economy. Yes there is no question about it that the tax benefits associated with real estate ownership have truly proven to be substantial.

Tax Advice For People Purchasing Real Estate

I would strongly suggest that potential property owners seek competent tax advice prior to purchasing any piece of real estate. Why ? So that they have a full understanding of what their potential tax benefits will be prior to ownership. The time to find out what the “ax benefits will be when purchasing real estate is before signing of Agreements Of Sale, making final settlement, and taking title not afterwards.

Tax Advice For People Selling Real Estate

I would also strongly suggest that potential property owners seek competent tax advice prior to selling any piece of real estate. Why ? So that they have a full understanding of what their potential tax liabilities will be prior to conveying title. The time to find out what the potential tax liabilities are when selling real estate is before signing of Agreements Of Sale, making final settlement, and conveying title not afterwards.

Mathematical Example As To Why Owning Real Estate Is Statistically Better Than Renting

Let’s assume that home buyers decide to purchase a home for ( $200,000 ) in the year 2008 and during the existence of the strongest Buyer’s Market of all time. Let’s further assume that 15 years later the home has decreased ( depreciated ) in value by ( $50,000 ) and that they can now only sell it for ( $ 150,000 ). The immediate reaction that most people would have to this scenario is that these poor and unfortunate home buyers have lost ($50,000) during this 15 year period. Not true. Actually these home buyers have made money and for that matter a lot of money. Perhaps as much as around ( $200,000 ) and here’s why.

Let’s also assume that these home buyers were able to pay off their mortgage during this 15 year period as a result of learning and applying the financial secrets that enable home owners to pay off their mortgages much faster. As a result of selling their home and receiving net proceeds of ( $150,000 ) they can now use this money to 1) purchase another home, 2) help retire on, or 3) do virtually whatever they want. In addition to the ( $150,000 ) in net proceeds they probably made about another ( $50,000 ) as well. How ? As a result of owning their home and being able to deduct things like 1) mortgage interest, 2) property taxes, and 3) other miscellaneous types of deductions associated with real estate ownership their tax refunds from Uncle Sam probably increased by another ( $50,000 ) during the 15 year period.

Therefore as a result of receiving the ( $150,000 ) in net proceeds and the ( $50,000 ) in additional tax refunds these poor and unfortunate home buyers have actually made approximately ( $200,000 ) during a 15 year period even though the home they purchased and sold decreased in value by ( $50,000 ).

Now let’s analyze how much money these home buyers would have made, during the same 15 year period, had they decided to rent rather than purchase. Assuming that their income and expenses would have been the same during this time frame they would have made nothing ( $0 ).

Hopefully this mathematical example makes it perfectly clear as to why purchasing and owning real estate offers substantial financial advantages that unfortunately renting does not. This is true even in cases when real estate decreases in value. Hopefully a word to the wise should prove to be sufficient.

Friday, September 24, 2010

Anti-War Activists TERRORIZED by FBI

Feels kinda like the 60's all over again - Except back then, we had more PRO BONO Civil Rights Lawyers. Its all about Big Corporations and the Big-Bucks now;

Sunday, September 19, 2010

Jubic v. Jubic and McAllister / On Appeal

Works in Progress                        STATEMENT OF FACTS
I will be commencing work upon this soon. I am waiting for a copy of the trial transcripts but meanwhile I can write out the statement of facts. its getting down to that time when I can put it off no longer.

A Fine Example of the American Just-Us System

Well after hubby got crusified in supreme court having had to represent himself cause his private lawyer went and got himself permanently disbarred (for reasons unrelated to this case) and after many requests for assignment of counsel were denied,.....his case was thrown out basically for two reasons;
(1) failure to acertain an exact amount of damages
(hubby was suing for an unspecifed amount based on the fact that an accounting was denied to him by the partners. It was hoped that the trial court would have ordered an accounting but the court determined that hubby was not entitled to an accounting because he was not a "partner" in the venture, but instead was a tenant-in-common.
(2) Not a partner: what the court failed to realize that in New York Partnerhsip law it is stated that if tenants in common engage in the venture soley for commerical purposes, then the tenancy in common is to be treated as a partnerhsip.....

So now we are on appeal to the appellate div 3rd dept and since we are broke and in fact still in a chapter 13 BK, hubby moved for permission to appeal as a poor person for the purposes of getting fees wavied that are necessary for prosecution of his appeal. And this is the strangest decision I have ever heard of coming out of any court: Hubbies motion to appeal as a poor person was denied, BUT, the judge went on to say that the ($250.00) filing fee would be we were thinking, well, at least we got the filing fee waived, and asking, what expenses are we going to have to pay in order to perfect the appeal. One call to the court clerk cleared up that mystery. Now we have to come up with $1,800 to pay the cost of having the trial record transcribed.

Wednesday, September 1, 2010

Jubic v. Jubic, et al; Response to Replies





V. Docket # 510140



I George Jubic, aka George M. Jubic, Jr., am the appellant in the above mentioned case and

1. On or about July 23, 2010 I did submit to this court an application to proceed on appeal as a poor person from a decision and order of the Supreme Court of the State of New York for Rensselaer County dated May 17, 2010, a copy of said Order was included with the application.

2. A copy of the application was forwarded by regular mail to the attorney for defendants Mr. Michael Mansion, as well as a copy sent to the office of the Rensselaer County Attorney.

3. By letter dated _____________________, this court acknowledged receipt of said application and issued a return date of August 23, 2010.

4. On or about the 18th day of august, 2010, I did receive a reply in opposition from Jill A. Kehn, an attorney assigned to represent the Rensselaer County Attorneys office, and on or about that same time I did also receive a reply in opposition from the attorney for the defendants, Mr. Michael Mansion.

5. I am submitting this response to the replies in opposition on the grounds that both Ms. Kehn and Mr. Mansion have mis-construed the application as being something that it is not, as well as to clear up some other false, erroneous and/or otherwise mis-leading statements contained in their respective replies that I believe will only confuse or cloud the issue.


6. In the reply from Ms Kehn of the Rensselaer Co. Attorneys Office, it is stated, in relevant part, that “Mr. Jubic is seeking counsel for an appeal of a final order of the Rensselear County Supreme Court dismissing his causes of action for an accounting of partnership funds, dissolution of partnership property, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud and unjust enrichment.” (See Respondent Kehns reply, paragraph 3)

7. The first error in Ms Kehan reply is that I DO NOT seek appointment of counsel for the purpose of appeal. The sole purpose of my application to this court for permission to appeal as a poor person is for a waiver of the fees. It is my intention to perfect the appeal in my capacity as a pro se litigant.

8. In her reply, Ms Kehan states, in relevant part, …”in addition, the issue of assigned counsel was also reviewed by the trial court. In its Order & Decision dated June 16, 2009, the court denied the appellants request for the assignment of counsel on the grounds that the appellant failed to demonstrate the merits of his case.” (See Kehan reply, para. 5)

9. While it is true I did make application to the trail court for assignment of counsel after my private attorney had been permanently dis-barred, to the best of my recollection and belief the application for assignment of trial counsel was denied on the basis of the courts stated belief that it lacked the authority to assign counsel in this case, being that no “personal freedoms” were involved.

10. Ms Kehns also opposed my application to proceed on appeal as a poor person on the grounds, as so stated, in relevant part,….”The onus is placed upon the applicant to demonstrate the necessity of his designation as a poor person. He has failed to meet that burden (para 7) and in asking that my application be denied. Ms Kehn also added that …“In the absence of the applicants clear demonstration of his poverty ……this court should deny the application.“ (para 8)

11. While Ms Kehn suggests that I have failed in my burden to prove my indigency, I would ask the court to make note of the fact that I submitted my application for permission to proceed as a poor person on the documents provided to me by this court, and have honestly answered all of the questions therein pertaining to my financial condition. I also indicated in those same forms provided to me by this court, that I am currently in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy which also supports my claim of indigency.


12. Upon a reading of the reply from Mr. Mansion, the attorney for the Defendants, it is clear that Mr. Mansion also mis-construes my application for permission to appeal as a poor person as an application for assignment of counsel on appeal (see Mansion reply para 6)

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons as mention above, both the replies in opposition to my application for permission to appeal to this court as a poor person should be disregarded, as I pray this court to grant me poor person status for the sole purpose of waiving the filing fees, and for any other further relief this court may deem just and / or necessary.

Dated__________________ ______________________________

George J. Jubic, Appellant, Pro Se

118 River Rd. 2nd Fl.

Johnsonville, NY 12094

(518) 753-7791


I George J. Jubic, do hereby swear in lieu of Notary and under threat of penalty for perjury, that I have on this 1st day of September, 2010, duly fax over a copy of this Response to Respondents Replies to the following concerned parties:

Clerk of the Court , Supreme Ct. Appellate Div.3rd. Dept. at fax # (518) 471-4750

Mr. Michael P. Mansion, Attorney for Defendants at fax # ___________________

Ms. Jill A. Kehn, Rensselaer Co. Attorney at fax # (518) 270-2954

And have also sent hard copies out this same day to the same concerned parties at these addresses:

Clerk of the Court Michael P Mansion, Attorney for Defendants
1523 Central Ave.
Albany, NY ___________

Supreme Court Appellate Division 1528 Central Av.
3rd Dept. Box 7288 Albany, NY 12205

Jill A. Kehn, Rensselaer Co. Attorney
Ned Pattison Gov’t Center
1600 Seventh Ave.
Troy, NY 12180

Sunday, July 18, 2010

Former Civil Rights Attorney Lynne Stewart Re-Sentenced to 10 Years

Lynne Stewart (CBS affiliate WCBS)

NEW YORK (CBS/WCBS) Federal prosecutors may finally believe Lynne Stewart has received the sentence she deserves after a judge added nearly eight years to the 70-year-old civil rights lawyer's original two and a half year prison sentence for letting a jailed Egyptian sheik pass messages to his radical followers.

An appeals court ordered a new sentencing after prosecutors pushed for a lengthier sentence, 15-30 years, due to the "deadly serious nature" of her crime, and Federal Judge John Koeltl agreed.

Judge Koetl listened to Stewart's pleas to reinstate the original sentence she had been given in 2006 because of her diminishing health, but the voices of the prosecutors rang louder, reports CBS affiliate WCBS.

Koetl sentenced the former lawyer who has defended Black Panthers and anti-war radicals to an additional ten years for committing perjury while defending the Egyptian sheik who plotted to blow up New York City landmarks, says WCBS.

He also believed that Stewart had no remorse after her first sentencing when she commented that she would be able to serve her sentence while standing on her head, reports the New York Daily News.

"I have since learned, judge, that nobody, particularly this 70-year-old woman can do 28 months standing on their head," Steweard told Koeltl.

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

The Issues on Appeal / Notice of Appeal

Pt. 1


(a) Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Request for Assignment of Counsel

(i) Where Plaintiffs privately retained attorney had been permanently disbarred (for reasons unrelated to his case)
(ii) Where Plaintiff was an indigent debtor currently in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and had no disposable income
(iii) Where Plaintiff provided documentary evidence from medical professionals that he was not mentally capable to represent himself

(b) Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Request for an Accounting

(i) Where accounting was needed to determine actual damages suffered by the Plaintiff
(ii) Where Plaintiff showed by documentary and testimonial evidence adduced at trial that he was in fact a partner in the tenants-in-common relationship and provided to the court as proof;
1. A copy of the deed for the partnership property with his name on it
2. A copy of a loan with his name on it, taken out jointly by the partners for construction of the partnership property
3. A copy of a spreadsheet provided to him by the defendants showing that he was a partner in the venture and had contributed to same

(c ) Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintffs Case for Failure to Ascertain the Exact Amount of Damages Claimed

(d) Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs Case on the Grounds of The Courts Stated Belief That No Partnership Existed and Therefore Reasoning that Plaintiff was not Entitled to any of the Relief Sought in his Complaint

(e) Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs Case Based on Its Determination That a Tenancy-in-Common Relationship Did Not a Partnership Make, Despite the Fact that the Tenancy-in-Common was Formed Solely as a Commercial Enterprise (NY Partnership Law Art. 2, ss10(1) and ss 11 (2); see also IRS Tax Law, Pub. 541, Cat. 10571D “Partnerships“______.

Thursday, June 17, 2010


San Francisco Passes Cellphone Radiation Law

Published: June 15, 2010

SAN FRANCISCO — Imposing roughly the same cautionary standards for cellphones as for fatty food or sugary soda, this city — never shy about its opinions — voted on Tuesday to require all retailers to display the amount of radiation each phone emits.

A new law in San Francisco was hailed by Mayor Gavin Newsom as a major victory for cellphone shoppers' right to know.
The law — believed to be the first of its kind in the nation — came despite a lack of conclusive scientific evidence showing that the devices are dangerous, and amid opposition from the wireless telephone industry, which views the labeling ordinance as a potential business-killing precedent.

But the administration of Gavin Newsom, the city’s tech-happy mayor (he has more than 1.3 million followers on Twitter), called the vote a major victory for cell phone shoppers’ right to know.

“It’s information that’s out there if you’re willing to look hard enough,” said Tony Winnicker, a spokesman for Mr. Newsom. “And we think that for the consumer for whom this is an area of concern, it ought to be easier to find.”

Under the law, retailers will be required to post materials — in at least 11-point type — next to phones, listing their specific absorption rate, which is the amount of radio waves absorbed into the cellphone user’s body tissue. These so-called SAR rates can vary from phone to phone, but all phones sold in the United States must have a SAR rate no greater than 1.6 watts per kilogram, according to the Federal Communications Commission, which regulates the $190 billion wireless industry.

But John Walls, a spokesman for C.T.I.A. - The Wireless Association, a trade group, said that forcing retailers to highlight that information might actually confuse consumers into thinking “some phones are safer than others.”

“We believe there is an overwhelming consensus of scientific belief that there is no adverse health effect by using wireless devices,” Mr. Walls said, “and this kind of labeling gets away from what the F.C.C.’s standard actually represents.”

San Francisco, whose health- and eco-conscious residents already face mandatory composting and a ban on plastic bags, is not the first place to consider putting notices on cellphones. Earlier this month, the California Senate voted down an even more wide-ranging labeling bill. A bill in Maine that would have required warning labels on cellphones like those on cigarettes was defeated in March.

Part of that legislative track record may stem from the fact that there is little conclusive proof that cellular devices are hazardous. Both the National Cancer Institute and the F.C.C. say that there is no scientific evidence that wireless phones are dangerous, but each agency continues to monitor continuing medical studies.

A major study of cellphone use in 13 countries published online last month in the International Journal of Epidemiology found no increased risk for the two most common types of brain tumors, according to the cancer institute. In the most extreme cellphone users, there was a small increase in a type of cancer that attacks the cells that surround nerve cells, though researchers found that finding inconclusive.

In San Francisco, officials were cautioning that the law was not meant to discourage cellphone use, or sales, rather merely to inform consumers.

“This is not about telling people not to use cellphones,” said Mr. Winnicker. “Nobody loves his iPhone more than Mayor Newsom.”

Malia Wollan contributed reporting

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Litigation Group Takes On Class-Action Bans

Public Citizen Litigation Group's next Supreme Court argument (our 57th) comes in a case of crucial importance to consumers and employees. The question to be decided is whether companies ban class actions in their take-it-or-leave-it contracts.
If you have signed up for a credit card, purchased cell-phone or cable service, or taken a job with a large employer, the chances are good that you have signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. Increasingly, many of these agreements not only force people to arbitrate any disputes, rather than having the option of going to court, but they include clauses that purport to strip consumers and employees of the right to seek classwide relief - whether in court or in arbitration.
Whether corporations can enforce class-action bans is a vigorously disputed question in consumer and employment law. The answer matters because class actions are often the only way to stop companies from getting away with practices that cheat large numbers of people out of small amounts of money. As Judge Posner has written, "[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."
On Monday, May 24, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, which presents the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts rulings that particular class-action bans are unconscionable under generally applicable state contract law. Along with attorneys at Hulett Harper Stewart and at Nicholas & Butler in San Diego, the Litigation Group represents the respondents, Californians who seek to sue AT&T for imposing fraudulent charges for cell phone service.
You can read AT&T's cert. petition and our brief in opposition on our website

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Casino Counseling Program Using Extortion?

I-Team: Ch. 8, LV, Nv.
Posted: May 25, 2010 5:09 PM EDT Updated: May 25, 2010 5:29 PM EDT

LAS VEGAS -- Imagine you get into a drunken fight at a casino and find yourself getting tossed into a backroom. Any other place you'd get thrown out. Here, you watch a video and are given a choice.

Las Vegas Metro Police Officer Jose Montoya tells you United States Justice Associates could save your career. Just admit you're guilty, waive rights to an attorney and pay $500 immediately, and all your problems go away.

Robert Draskovich is the attorney representing USJA and its owner. He says using the private counseling service kept Metro from dealing with petty crimes and that the program and video just streamlined a normally slow process.

See the USJA Detainee Form (click link below for original article w/ working link to Form)

"It was easier, not only for the casinos personnel, it was easier on Metro. It was easier on all those involved in the justice system," he said.

"Basically saying, 'Hey, we've got you now and we'll call the police unless you give us money.' There is a word for that: it is called extortion," said Allen Lichtenstein with the American Civil Liberties Union.

Lichtenstein was disgusted with the video and USJA's tactics. His opinion echoes that of Metro's investigation: twice over the last seven months, police raided USJA looking for evidence of extortion and the "very threatening" nature of the program.

"The casinos do not have the right to pretend that they are the police," said Lichtenstein.

He says the legal threats are exaggerated and the theatrics and official tone are misleading. The county, the courts or Metro have not given any true approval and Lichtenstein says it scares people into complying.

One account they didn't snag was MGM Mirage. Corporate security chief Tom Lozich questioned the legality, and the intent, of the program. For every $500 fee, the casinos got $100 in return. Lozich says that's incentive to haul people in.

"When you look at it from an integrity standpoint, that kind of brings that into kind of a questionable area," he said.

Station Casinos security chief Bill Young did like the program. He says security officers can decide guilt or innocence best in most cases.

"It reduces the need for a prosecutor being involved -- a public defender," he said.

But Young not only runs security for Station, he's the former sheriff of Clark County and says he used USJA at the urging of Chief Judge Doug Smith. In a letter supporting the counseling program, Smith said he has "never used one that is better" and that he "wholeheartedly, without reservation" recommends using it.

Smith declined to comment, but USJA was in court Tuesday trying to find out more about the raids.

Despite the investigation and court activity, Young stands his ground. He thinks the program does not look like extortion and their tactics shouldn't be criticized.

"I don't know who's pushing this. I don't know if it's the ACLU, but it's a crock of s*** as far as I'm concerned. Excuse my language," he said.

Casinos in charge of the law. No oversight, no accountability but finally some scrutiny making its way into the backrooms.

Shortly after Sheriff Doug Gillespie came on board, the officer in the video was taken out and replaced by an actor. Metro never approved this program or signed off.

Bill Young and Stations ended their contract after learning USJA was not actually forwarding cases to prosecution if the person failed to follow through on counseling.

The owner of USJA, Steven Brox, has not been charged on this case. Because of the Metro raids, the program has temporarily been shut down.

Monday, May 24, 2010

Sunday, May 23, 2010

ALS Grad to Study Hudson River Corridor

Albany Law Scool Grad of ’12, was awarded fellowship to study land use on Hudson . Tuesday, May 11, 2010 at 10:04am

Nikki Nielson ’12 was recently awarded a Tibor T. Polgar Fellowship to spend the summer researching conservation easements along the Hudson River corridor stretching from New York City to Troy, N.Y.

At the end of the summer, she will present her findings to the Hudson River Foundation and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the two entities who administer the fellowship.

“Ulster County alone has 11 land trusts, and there are many more throughout the Hudson Valley.” explained Nielson, who operated her own grant writing and project management firm in New Paltz, N.Y., prior to enrolling at Albany Law.

“My work will be to step back and try to determine how this type of land can best be used while preserving environmental benefits.”

Many historic properties along the Hudson River - estates of industrialists, religious retreats and agricultural lands - have been converted over the years from private ownership into a mixture of public, private and quasi-public ownership. One of these conversion mechanisms has been for the landowner to grant conservation easements to restrict development of their property.

However, there is currently a lack of information about the implementation of conservation easements, as well as some confusion as to the legal implications of such a designation. Nielson will spend the summer surveying the quantity and types of easements along the Hudson River, analyzing existing case law and legal research on the topic, and developing analysis and recommendations for future implementation.

She hopes to publish a paper based on her work.

“Ultimately, my goal is to inform the public policy discussion on how best to move forward with a comprehensive plan while still protecting the land for future generations,” she said.

The Polgar Fellowship provides a summertime grant and research funds for up to eight college students to conduct research on the Hudson River. The program’s objectives are to gather information on all aspects of the Hudson River and to train students in conducting estuarine studies and public policy research.

Professor Keith Hirokawa, who taught Nielson’s Property class, will act as her advisor during the fellowship. “He’s the one who encouraged me to apply,” she recalled.

After teaching in the Ravenswood City School District in East Palo Alto, Calif., Nielson moved to the Hudson Valley in 2001 and took a position developing grants and managing projects for municipalities and regional organizations.

She launched her own firm, Arcady Solutions, in 2008, where she provided writing, research, needs assessments, project development, fundraising and project management services for organizations in the fields of economic development, environmental sustainability through the protection of open space and educational equity.

“I’ve always wanted to go to law school,” she said. “And now, based on my prior work experience and current interests, I really feel like I have direction in terms of what kind of law I want to pursue.”

Nielson, who lives in New Paltz with her husband and their daughter, holds a B.S. from the University of Rochester, and a M.A. from Teacher's College, Columbia University, in politics and education.

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

The Partnership Property & Conflict of Interest w/ the Appraiser

(Under) assessed by Holden Associates in 2004 at $120,000 (hired by Defendant Robert Jubic for his divorce),+troy,+ny&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=19+Cross+St,+Troy,+Rensselaer,+New+York+12180&ll=42.705875,-73.697644&spn=0,0.003653&t=k&z=19&layer=c&cbll=42.705714,-73.698665&panoid=5evbHRJpynOktXQYIUgCgw&cbp=13,81.25,,0,7.05
and re-accessed again in 2007 (hired by the court) also by Holden and Associates at the same $120,000 value~!

At the time of the second (court ordered appraisal) Defendant Robert Jubic was the only one accompanying the appraiser for the walk-through of the building. There was no one else there to witness if a "bribery" had occurred. However,

Do you think there is possibly "too cozy" of a relationship here between the Defendant Robert Jubic and his regular appraiser Holden and Associates to have had allowed Holden do the re-accessment three years later for the court? Isnt it strange how the court just pulled "Holden and Associates" out of the hat to do the second appraisal? Isnt it really strange that this BEAUTIFUL 5 unit apartment building was (under) appraised (for the defendants divorce) in 2004 at $120,000 and then again re-appraised in 2007 ("for the courts) at the same figure of $120,000? Isnt it strange that the defendant didnt notify the court of the conflict of interest when he found out that (his personal appraiser which he uses on a regular basis for his numberous OTHER income properties) ? We did not become aware of the fact that Holden had appraised the building for the defendant in 2004 until after the (damage) of the 2007 appraisal was done.

Isnt it strange that between the years of 2004 and 2007 this BEAUTIFUL commercial income-generating 5 unit apartment complex did not appreciate in value by even one dime, while other commerical properties in the area increased by about 8% ? Me thinks so. How about you?

The IRS Describes What is a Partnership

See also NYS Partnership Law

Determining When a Partnership Exists

Determining "What is a Partnership" under the Uniform Partnership Act;

Saturday, April 3, 2010

Trial Court Neglects to Swear in Jury, Murder Conviction Overturned

...only in Rensselaer Co., MY district!


2010 NY Slip Op 02711



Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department.

Decided April 1, 2010.

Ray Kelly, Albany, for petitioner.

Christopher J. Belling, New York Prosecutors Training Institute, Albany, respondent pro se.

Before: Cardona, P.J., Lahtinen, Malone Jr., Stein and Gary, JJ.


Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to a prison term of life without parole. On direct appeal to this Court, petitioner argued, among other things, that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the conviction should be reversed because the prospective jurors were not properly sworn. Ultimately, this Court reversed on the law and remitted the matter to County Court for a new trial based on our finding that the prospective jurors had not been properly sworn to truthfully answer the questions posed to them regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors (People v Hoffler, 53 AD3d 116, 120-124 [2008], lvs denied 11 NY3d 832, 834 [2008]). In so doing, we determined that the failure to administer this oath to the jurors constituted a fundamental defect in the proceedings, rendering the trial a nullity (id.).

Respondent County Judge of Rensselaer County was assigned to preside over the retrial of the indictment against petitioner and respondent Christopher J. Belling (hereinafter respondent) was appointed as a Special Prosecutor to prosecute the case. Petitioner moved to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment that charged him with the crimes of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree[ 1 ] on the ground that retrial would violate his statutory and constitutional double jeopardy rights. Upon the denial of the motion, petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents from trying him on the remaining counts[ 2 ] . Because we now conclude that, under the particular circumstances of this case, petitioner has not demonstrated a clear legal right to such relief, the petition must be dismissed.

Preliminarily, we note that a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition is a proper mechanism to raise a claim that retrial is barred by double jeopardy principles (see Matter of Di Lorenzo v Murtagh, 36 NY2d 306, 309-310 [1975]; Matter of Stewart v Hartnett, 34 AD3d 1134, 1136 [2006], appeal dismissed 8 NY3d 936 [2007]). Nonetheless, a petitioner must "demonstrate a clear right to [such] extraordinary remedy" (Matter of Baim v Eidens, 279 AD2d 787, 789 [2001]) and the absence of an adequate remedy at law (see Matter of Newfield Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 66 AD3d 1314, 1315 [2009]; Rafferty v Owens, 82 AD2d 582, 585 [1981]; see also Matter of Whitehead v Vizzie, 223 AD2d 938 [1996]). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against repeated prosecutions for the same criminal offense after an acquittal or a conviction (see US Const 5th, 14 Amends; NY Const, art I, § 6; CPL 40.20 et seq.; People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 82 [2002]). As relevant here, under New York's statutory double jeopardy scheme, a person is considered to have been "prosecuted" on an offense after the action proceeds to trial and the jury has been impaneled and sworn (CPL 40.30 [1] [b]). Thus, in a trial on an indictment, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not implicated — and jeopardy does not attach — in the absence of a duly impaneled and sworn jury (see Matter of Rivera v Firetog, 11 NY3d 501, 506 [2008], cert denied ___ US ___, 129 S Ct 2012 [2009]; People v Mergenthaler, 13 AD3d 984, 985 [2004]).

Here, because it has been established that the jury was never properly sworn pursuant to CPL 270.15 (1) (a) and that such failure "invalidated the entire trial" (People v Hoffler, 53 AD3d at 124), the trial was a nullity and petitioner was never "prosecuted" under the indictment (see Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 40.30, at 62; Matter of Cummings v Koppell, 212 AD2d 11, 14 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 702 [1995]; see also Matter of Cunningham v Dwyer, 302 AD2d 888, 889 [2003], appeal dismissed 99 NY2d 649 [2003]). Consequently, petitioner was never placed in jeopardy even though the trial proceeded to its conclusion (see CPL 40.30 [3]; Matter of Stewart v Hartnett, 34 AD3d at 1136; People v Mergenthaler, 13 AD3d at 985; see generally Matter of Kelly v Bruhn, 3 AD3d 783, 784 [2004], appeal dismissed 2 NY3d 793 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 698 [2004]; Matter of Cheatom v Kreindler, 173 AD2d 703, 703 [1991]; Matter of Chang v Rotker, 155 AD2d 49, 54-55 [1990])[ 3 ] . Nor are we persuaded that double jeopardy principles are implicated because the fundamental error here — failure to properly administer the oath to the jurors — could have been corrected before the trial commenced. Notwithstanding defense counsel's timely objection to the error, County Court (McGrath, J.) apparently proceeded on a mistaken impression that the oath had been properly administered (see People v Hoffler, 53 AD3d at 120). In the absence of evidence of intentional or egregious misconduct by the People (see People v Adames, 83 NY2d 89, 90-93 [1993]) or evidence that a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial was otherwise irreparably harmed by the error such that it could not be cured by retrial (see Matter of Randall v Rothwax, 78 NY2d 494, 499 [1991], cert denied 503 US 972 [1992]), double jeopardy does not bar petitioner's retrial on the indictment.

Petitioner's argument that retrial is barred by virtue of what he characterizes as a second fundamental defect — this Court's failure to address petitioner's legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims on his direct appeal of the prior murder conviction — is also unavailing. Where, as here, a fundamental defect rendered the entire trial invalid, we discern no impediment to petitioner's retrial (compare Burks v United States, 437 US 1, 15 [1978]). Furthermore, inasmuch as petitioner had an adequate remedy at law[ 4 ] and is now seeking to collaterally attack our determination and obtain review of his claims regarding legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence, which were not previously addressed by this Court, a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking prohibition is not an appropriate mechanism to raise such claims (see Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d 348, 353 [1986]; see also Matter of DiSimone v Adler, 67 AD3d 677, 678-679 [2009], appeal dismissed ___ NY3d ___ [Feb. 23, 2010]; Rafferty v Owens, 82 AD2d at 585).

In view of the foregoing, we find that petitioner has not demonstrated that he has a clear legal right to prohibition (see Matter of Baim v Eidens, 279 AD2d at 789; see also Matter of Holtzman v Goldman, 71 NY2d 564, 569 [1988]). Petitioner's remaining contentions have been reviewed and are without merit.

Cardona, P.J., Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Garry, JJ., concur.

ADJUDGED that the petition is dismissed, without costs.

1. Prior to trial, County Court (McGrath, J.) had dismissed, with prejudice, one count of murder in the first degree and one count of conspiracy to commit murder.
2. The County Judge has indicated his intention not to appear in this proceeding and the Attorney General's office has chosen not to intervene pursuant to Executive Law § 71 and CPLR 1012 (b) (1).
3. In light of this determination, we need not reach petitioner's arguments regarding the constitutionality of CPL 40.30.
4. Petitioner could have moved in this Court to reargue our prior determination (see CPL 470.50; 22 NYCRR 800.14). Petitioner's assertion that he could not avail himself of such remedy because he was not aggrieved by our prior decision is belied by his commencement of the instant proceeding, in which he now argues that he was adversely affected, specifically by being subjected to retrial.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.


Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Pleading Hubbies Case to the NYCLU

March 27, 2010 LEGAL INTAKE

From: George J. Jubic
118 River Rd.
Johnsonville, NY 12094
(518) 753-7791

T0: New York State American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad St., 19th Fl.
New York, NY 10004

Re: George J. Jubic v. Robert Jubic and Robert McAllister
Supreme Court of the State of New York
County of Rensselaer
Case # 214005
Hon. Judge Christian Hummel, Jr.

Dear Sir or Madam,

My name is Christine A. Jubic and I have been a Constitutional Law paralegal for over 15 years. I am also the wife of the (pro se) plaintiff, George J. Jubic, in the above mentioned case that is scheduled for trial on April 26, 2010. It is in the matter of my husbands (forced) self-representation in his partnership dispute case that I am writing to you.


George and Robert Jubic are two brothers who’s father operated a family bar and grill for a number of years following WWII. George tended bar at the grill from the day he graduated high-school (1969) right up until the day it closed in 1984, when a fire destroyed the place. The burnt out building lay idle until in 1988 the father signed the property over (gifted) to the two brothers on the condition that they “go partners” in converting the old building into a five (5) unit apartment complex upon which they could depend on an income for life for their retirement days. At the time of the signing over of the deed, brother Robert bought with him a stranger into the mix,….(defendant) Robert McAllister who is a close personal friend of Roberts and a partner in many other ventures singularly with Robert Jubic. Despite objections from family members, including those of George and his father, ….upon Robert Jubics insistence, Robert McAllisters name was added to the deed as a full 1/3rd partner.

Around about 1989 the three partners jointly took out a loan to buy materials and, being all in the home building, repair & maintenance business, they commenced construction on the building themselves. By the mid-1990s the building was complete and fully rented. Robert Jubic was the self-appointed accountant and promised my husband George that he would let him know as soon as the place was making money. My husband trusted his brother and put full faith and credit into his promise to inform him when dividends were being made. Years went by before my husband began to inquire as to the status of the partnerships earnings. However, all Robert would ever tell him is that “it would be 20 years or more” before any profits would be realized.” It is important to note that all through this “waiting time,” my husband George worked “elbow-to-elbow” with the other “partners” in repair and maintenance of the building…..contributing equally in (known) loan liabilities as well as contributing equally in “sweat equity.”

Around about the year 2000, I became aware through various sources, that in fact, all loans on building had been satisfied and that in fact, the venture was making money “hand over fist,” since about 1995-6. In fact, with the first $50,000 in profits, Robert Jubic and Robert McAllister in fact purchased a time share together in Las Vegas.

After verifying that in fact all of this was true, George tried unsuccessfully to settle the matter informally and asked several times for an accounting but none was ever forthcoming. Left with no other recourse, my husband then had to hire a lawyer to protect his interests in the partnership dividends and property. In the meanwhile, we were suffering such financial hardship that we were forced to file a Chap 13 bankruptcy to save our (one and only) home / house from foreclosure.

Discoveries were completed and a trial date was set. However, just weeks before the trial, Georges lawyer could not be found. A call to the NY Bar Association informed us that his lawyer had been permanently disbarred (for reason un-related to this case.)

Based on his indigent status, George made an application to the court for assignment of counsel. In that application, George submitted letters to the court from two of his psychologists validating the fact that, due to certain mental / cognitive disorders, George was not a candidate nor qualified to represent himself in court. Nevertheless, the court denied the motion indicating that it “did not” have the power to assign counsel in civil cases.

We have done everything possible to get legal representation for my husband. We have made dozens and dozens of inquiries to the various bar associations as well as individual lawyers and firms. We have sought help from the Legal Aid Society as well as the various Law School Clinics, all to no avail. I even made an attempt to in- plead myself on the case as an interested party but was denied and even BARRED from attending any conferences regarding the case.

As it stands now, my husband is in the untenable position of being forced into self-representation even though there is no doubt in his or anyone else’s mind that he is not IN THE LEAST BIT qualified. He knows NOTHING of the law or trial procedure and has problems speaking in front of people or communicating his thoughts well.

As a paralegal I am aware that there is a movement in legal circles calling for a “Civil Gideon,” which is a right to counsel in “certain” civil cases where vital interests are involved other than loss of freedom. While most such cases involve a state or administrative action against a party, ,….my husbands case involves only a private interest but I hold that the interest in maintaining ones solvency and “freedom from poverty” is as vital an interest as any . Justice Learned Hand once said, “Poverty imprisons people just as certain as do bars.” Moreover, in addition to the “vital interest” in maintaining solvency, there is the “vital interest” every citizen has in equal justice / equal access to the courts. It has been held in many cases, that “access to the courts” must be MEANINGFUL, and that meaningful access can ONLY be had through representation by a qualified attorney.

I am writing in hopes that your organization might be interested in litigating my husbands case on his behalf, as the outcome would have national implications and even IF NOT successfully won, would still make a GREAT progressive stride in the civil Gideon movement. I am hoping you will take my husbands case not only to see to it that justice is served for him, but for all indigent litigants involved in “vital interest” civil cases.

To learn more about the Civil Gideon movement, click on title above to follow this link;

Thanking you in advance for any consideration you may give this matter. We anxiously await your reply
(trial is scheduled to begin w/ jury selection on April 26, 2010, at 9:30 am in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Rensselaer Co.


Christine A Jubic for George J. Jubic

George J. Jubic
(518) 753 - 7791

Civil Right to Counsel / Civil Gideon News

Be sure to see at the end of this list of links, the entire text of the New York State Bar Associations "Civil Gideon Resolution"

The ABA Supports a Civil Right to Counsel;

The National Coalition for a Right to Civil Counsel;

Chief Judge Calls on New York to Uphold Civil Gideon;

A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor, By Paul Marvy and Debra Gardner;

California First State to Enact a Civil Gideon Right;

Wyoming Takes First Step Towards a Civil Gideon;

A Qualified Civil Gideon;

New Head of Boston Bar a Civil Gideonite;

The Civil Gideon Club, DC Branch;

Civil Gideon National Update #1;

Civil Gideon National Update #2;

The New York State Bar Associations "Civil Gideon Resolution" --


Laura K. Abel*


INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................33

A. Current Scope of the Right................................................41
B. Potential for Expansion .....................................................42
A. Current Scope of the Right................................................46
B. Potential for Expansion .....................................................47
CUSTODY AND SAFETY .......................................................................50
A. Cases Involving Child Custody.........................................50
1. Current Scope of the Right.......................................... 50
2. Potential for Expansion .............................................. 54
B. Cases Involving Safety......................................................54
1. Current Scope of the Right.......................................... 54
2. Potential for Expansion .............................................. 55
A. Current Scope of the Right................................................57
* Deputy Director, Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.
Electronic copy available at:


Potential for Expansion .....................................................58
OF SPECIAL OR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS.......................................60
People With Disabilities....................................................60
B. Children.............................................................................63
C. Seniors...............................................................................64
D. Prisoners............................................................................65
E. Immigrants ........................................................................66
VI. OTHER CATEGORIES OF CASES .................................................66
The Right to Counsel in Cases Involving Deprivation
of Physical Liberty ............................................................66
Current Scope of the Right.......................................... 66
Potential for Expansion .............................................. 69
The Right to Counsel in Other Types of Cases.................70
Electronic copy available at:




A core goal of the New York State Bar Association
(“NYSBA”) is to ensure that the justice system works, and that it
works for all New Yorkers.1 To that end, NYSBA promotes several
measures aimed at ensuring that all New Yorkers, regardless of income,
have access to lawyers to meet their important civil legal
needs. Among other things, NYSBA works to obtain adequate federal,
state and private funding for civil legal aid attorneys; fights restrictions
that hamper the work of federally funded civil legal aid attorneys;
promotes pro bono; and advocates for the availability of
attorneys’ fee awards in appropriate cases.

However, NYSBA’s 1990 New York Legal Needs Study
found, and many more recent studies have confirmed, that despite all
of these efforts, the existing resources are unable to meet the vast majority
of the civil legal needs of low-income people. In fact, every
year, at least 80% of the civil legal needs of low-income New Yorkers
go unmet. Many of the unmet legal needs concern issues of the
utmost importance to people’s lives, including housing, child custody,
food, shelter, employment, and health.2

1 Among NYSBA’s purposes are “to facilitate the administration of justice” and “to apply
its knowledge and experience in the field of the law to promote the public good.” Bylaws of
the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, art. II, at 3 (amended 2008).

2 NYSBA’s study found that among low-income people in New York State, “[n]ot more
than 14% of their overall need for legal assistance was being met.” N.Y. State Bar Ass’n,


This is an unacceptable state of affairs. A society is not truly
democratic, and its justice system not truly just, when its poorest citizens
have no access to the protection of its laws. When the result is
that families are unable to meet their basic human needs, it can fairly
be called an ongoing state of emergency. For this reason, the modern,
industrialized nations the United States generally views as our
peers in terms of governance systems provide for appointment of
counsel in many categories of civil cases as a matter of right.3

Expanding the right to counsel in civil cases is an essential
way to ensure that low-income people are able to access the justice
system in truly important cases. Without a right to counsel, most
low-income people with legal problems affecting their basic human
needs will never obtain legal representation and, as a result, will not
be able to receive a full and fair hearing of their case. Ironically,
most Americans already believe that a right to counsel exists for
these types of cases.4

Accordingly, NYSBA is joining other bar leaders around the
country to advocate for expansion of the right to counsel in civil
cases. In August, 2006, the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
passed the following resolution:

The New York Legal Needs Study (June 1990, revised and reprinted Dec. 1993), at 159. As
recently as 2005, the Legal Services Corporation, reviewing nine state legal needs studies
issued since 2000, reported that 20% is the upper limit of legal needs being met, and that in
most jurisdictions far fewer legal needs are being met. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP.,

3 See Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step With
the Rest of the Developed World, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769, 771-83, 787-88

4 Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must
Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 699, 716 (2006).


RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
urges federal, state and territorial governments to provide
legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense
to low income persons in those categories of
adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are
at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance,
safety, health or child custody, as determined by each

The report accompanying the resolution makes clear that the ABA
defines the right as encompassing representation in adversarial proceedings.
It therefore applies to “both judicial and some quasi-
judicial tribunals, because many of the disputes involving the basic
human needs . . . are, in one jurisdiction or another, allocated to administrative
agencies or tribunals.”6

NYSBA and eleven other state or local bar associations were
co-sponsors of the resolution. In the eighteen months since its passage,
the resolution has prompted additional action by those and other
bar associations:

NYSBA Immediate Past President Kate Madigan
has created a subcommittee of the President’s
Committee on Access to Justice focusing
on the civil right to counsel. One of the
subcommittee’s projects was planning a conference
titled, “An Obvious Truth: Creating an
Action Blueprint for a Civil Right to Counsel
5 See ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
507, 508 (2006).

6 Id. at 521.


in New York State.” The conference, which
was co-sponsored by NYSBA and the Touro
Law Center, was held on March 7, 2008.

The Minnesota State Bar Association and Boston
Bar Association have likewise created task
forces on the civil right to counsel.

The California Conference of Delegates of
California Bar Associations, Massachusetts
Bar Association, and Pennsylvania Bar Association
have all passed their own civil right to
counsel resolutions.
NYSBA’s current civil right to counsel work continues the
long-standing leadership role NYSBA, and New Yorkers in general,
have taken on this issue. Since the early 1970s, New York State has
had the broadest right to counsel in family cases of any state. New
York is the only state to provide counsel as of right for parents facing
loss of custody to a private party, and for people seeking domestic
violence restraining orders.7

New York law also provides judges with the discretion to appoint
counsel for civil litigants who have sought leave to proceed as a
poor person.8 Refusal to appoint counsel in an appropriate case may
constitute an abuse of discretion, particularly when the litigant is

7 See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 252-62 (2006).

8 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1101, 1102 (McKinney 2008).


“faced with a ‘grievous forfeiture or loss of a fundamental right.’ ”9
Courts have exercised their discretion to appoint counsel in a case
concerning a large amount of money, in an eviction case where the
tenant was away performing military service, and in matrimonial
cases.10 Unfortunately, counsel is rarely appointed under this provision,
likely because there is no dedicated funding for the courts to use
to pay appointed counsel,11 and because the statute fails to specify
any standards for courts to apply when deciding whether to appoint

Additionally, the courts in Orange, Putnam, and Westchester
counties, with assistance from Legal Services of the Hudson Valley
and Putnam Legal Aid Society, operate an assigned counsel program
in matrimonial cases. The attorneys who are assigned are not paid
but can apply for a fee award if one is available.

In the 1980s, NYSBA, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, and the New York County Lawyers’ Association all
actively supported state court litigation aimed at creating a right to
counsel for tenants facing eviction in New York City.12 Although the

9 Wills v. City of Troy, 686 N.Y.S.2d 154 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999) (quoting Morgenthau

v. Garcia, 561 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868-70 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990)). See also Yearwood v.
Yearwood, 387 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1976) (remanding for appointment
of counsel); Scherer, Right to Counsel, supra note 4, at 721.
10 Scherer, Right to Counsel, supra note 4, at 723; Application of Farrell, 486 N.Y.S. 130,
131 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1985) (denying attorney’s motion to vacate appointment
of counsel in a matrimonial matter).

11 See, e.g., Morgenthau, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 868-70 (declining to appoint counsel under

N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 11, in part because of the lack of any funding to compensate appointed
12 The vision behind the lawsuit is set forth in a series of law review articles authored by
Andrew Scherer, who is now Executive Director of Legal Services for New York City. See
Scherer, Right to Counsel, supra note 4, at 699; Andrew Scherer, Securing a Civil Right to
Counsel: The Importance of Collaborating, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675 (2006);
Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent


litigation ultimately failed on procedural grounds, it led the New
York City Council to allocate significant funding for civil legal aid
for families facing eviction.

The right to counsel in Housing Court continues to be the goal
of advocacy in New York City. On November 15, 2007, New York
City Council Members Rosie Mendez and Alan Gerson introduced
the first piece of municipal, state or federal legislation aimed at creating
a right to counsel in eviction and mortgage foreclosure cases.13
The bill, which would apply to low-income seniors within New York
City, has the support of a veto-proof majority of the City Council,
and also of the New York County Lawyers’ Association (“NYCLA”)
and more than ninety housing, senior and other advocacy groups. In
2005, NYCLA issued a report urging New York State to recognize a
right to counsel “for individuals in danger of losing their homes due
to a legal or administrative proceeding.” 14

An early draft of the instant Report was circulated to participants
in the conference, called “An Obvious Truth: Creating an Action
Blueprint for a Civil Right to Counsel in New York State,”
which NYSBA and the Touro Law Center co-sponsored on March 7,
2008. At the conference, each participant attended one of five working
groups, focused on the right to counsel in cases concerning: 1)

Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988).

EJECTMENT AND FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http:// webdocs. Int%2006482007.htm?CFID=2547622&CFTOKEN=



shelter, 2) sustenance (including employment and government benefits),
3) health, 4) child custody and safety (including domestic violence),
and 5) the legal needs of special or vulnerable populations
(including seniors, people with disabilities, immigrants, youth, and
prisoners). This final Report incorporates feedback and suggestions
from the conference.

This Report describes the existing scope of the right to counsel
in each of these categories of civil cases in New York State, as
well as in several categories for which the conference does not have
working groups (such as cases concerning physical liberty), and suggests
areas for expansion of the right in each category.

The New York State Bar Association is fully committed to the
goal of an expansive civil right to counsel in legal matters affecting
basic human needs, as called for by the 2006 ABA resolution. We
recognize however, that fully achieving that broad goal will take
time. This Report calls for the implementation of some immediate,
relatively simple, yet enormously compelling incremental steps that
New York State can and should take to move us toward a civil right
to counsel in cases concerning basic human needs.

In the short term, the New York State Legislature should expand
the civil right to counsel in New York by adopting the following
two measures, each of which is described more fully in the body of
the Report:

Shelter – In the area of shelter, as a next, important
step toward a meaningful right to counsel, we recommend
that the state adopt legislation to provide a right


to counsel for vulnerable low income people who face
eviction or foreclosure from their homes. As discussed
above, legislation providing this protection for
low-income seniors has already been introduced in the
New York City Council, and Senator Liz Krueger intends
to introduce State legislation in 2009 that would
provide this protection for low-income seniors and
people with disabilities.15

Sustenance – The existing right to counsel for unemployment
insurance claimants should attach earlier in
the appeals process, and the right should be implemented
in a more effective manner. Currently, only
claimants who have received a favorable decision
from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and
are defending that decision in an appeal to the Appellate
Division or Court of Appeals brought by another
party have a right to counsel. That right should be extended
to claimants who have received a favorable determination
from an administrative law judge, and
who are defending against an appeal before the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board. Additionally,
the existing $500 cap on reimbursement for appointed
counsel should be raised to a level high enough to ensure
that attorneys will accept the cases.16
15 See discussion infra Part I.B.
16 See discussion infra Part II.B.


In the longer term, the legislature should adopt the other
measures discussed in this Report, to ensure that litigants are able to
fully participate in civil cases concerning their basic human needs.

A. Current Scope of the Right
According to the ABA, “ ‘Shelter’ includes a person or family’s
access to or ability to remain in an apartment or house, and the
habitability of that shelter.”17 The only currently recognized right to
counsel in civil cases involving shelter in New York is a federal right
to representation by an attorney secured by the Legal Services Corporation
for all people facing civil forfeiture of their primary residence.

There are a few types of cases concerning shelter in which
courts have discretion to appoint counsel.19 For example, New York
courts “may appoint any attorney” for members of the military facing
eviction who are unable to personally appear in the eviction proceeding.
20 Additionally, federal law gives courts discretion to appoint
counsel to “a person alleging a discriminatory housing practice or a
person against whom such a practice is alleged” in state or federal
court.21 It appears that New York courts rarely, if ever, appoint coun

17 ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 522.

18 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(11) (2000).

19 These categories are in addition to the discretion courts have under Article CPLR 11 to
appoint counsel in any category of cases, as discussed above.

20 N.Y. MIL. LAW § 303(1) (McKinney 2008); 444 W. 54th St. Tenants Ass’n v. Costello,
523 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).

21 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(b) (West 2007).


sel under these provisions.

Additionally, people living in mental health facilities can receive
legal services as of right from the Mental Hygiene Legal Service
related to their care and treatment, including some instances
concerning the conditions in which they are housed.22

B. Potential for Expansion
As discussed above in the Introduction, there is a bill pending
in the New York City Council that, if passed, will create a right to
counsel for low-income seniors facing eviction from their apartment
or foreclosure on their home. The bill, titled Intro. 648 of 2007,
would provide counsel to seniors sixty-two years old or older, whose
household income is low enough to quality for the Senior Citizens
Rent Increase (“SCRIE”) program, and who are facing eviction from
their home in a nonpayment, holdover, ejectment or foreclosure proceeding.

This bill resulted from a long-term consensus among advocates
for low-income people in New Yorkers that there is a pressing
need for expansion of the right to counsel to cases concerning the
eviction of low-income tenants. This agreement has manifested itself
in a number of ways over the years:

In October 2005, stakeholders in the New York City
Housing Court attending a conference convened by
the New York County Lawyers Association issued a
22 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.03(c), (e) (McKinney 2007).

23 See INT. NO. 648 § 21-1001(b)(i). The proposed amendment adds Article 10 to sec. 1,
tit. 21 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, and would “provid[e] legal
counsel for certain tenants subject to eviction, ejectment or foreclosure proceedings.”


report urging the State to recognize a right to counsel
“for individuals in danger of losing their home due to
a legal or administrative proceeding.”24 Subsequently,
in 2005 NYCLA passed a resolution “endors[ing], as a
matter of principle, a right to the appointment of free
counsel for all tenants in Housing Court unable to afford

In the 1980s, bar leaders, the legal services community
and others engaged in a massive litigation effort to establish
a right to counsel for low-income New Yorkers
facing eviction.26
In recent years, the mortgage foreclosure crisis has given rise
to increasing interest in establishing a right to counsel in mortgage
foreclosure proceedings in which homeowners risk losing their primary
residence.27 For this reason, the New York City bill discussed
above provides for a right to counsel in mortgage foreclosure cases as
well as in eviction cases.

The reasons for providing counsel are similar in eviction
cases and in foreclosure cases, and include: 1) the importance of decent
housing to a family’s life (as recognized by the New York State
Constitution) and the difficulty of replacing it once it is lost, 2) the

24 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT, supra note 14, at 30.

(March 14, 2005), available at

26 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

27 See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS.LAW §§ 1301-1309.


adversarial nature of the proceedings, 3) the complicated nature of
the substantive law and procedures, 4) the imbalance in power between
landlords and lenders on the one hand, who usually have representation,
and tenants and homeowner/borrowers on the other, who
usually do not, and 5) the many studies showing that representation in
eviction cases makes a huge difference in whether tenants are able to
stay in their homes.28 In mortgage foreclosure cases there are the
added factors that illegal practices are increasingly common in the
subprime mortgage market,29 and that it can be extremely difficult to
prove the fraudulent practices without the involvement of a lawyer.

There are many other types of proceedings involving shelter
to which a right to counsel should attach. They include:

other cases in which tenants seek housing, seek improvements
in their living conditions, or contest eviction,
any cases in which tenants seek improvement
in their housing conditions;
lawsuits in which prospective tenants allege
that they are being denied a lease on the basis
of race or for another reason that is unlawful
under federal, state or local law;30
28 See Scherer, Right to Counsel, supra note 4, at 704, 707, 709-10, 717-19; Laura K.
Abel, Make “You Have a Right to a Lawyer” a Reality in Housing Court,
TENANT/INQUILINO, Mar. 2005, at 1, available at; Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter, supra note
12, at 557, 558, 559, 570-72.

available at

30 As noted above, New York courts have the discretion, but are not required to, appoint


administrative proceedings in which people
denied public housing contest their denials,31
or tenants residing in public housing contest
the terms or termination of their leases or seek
improvements in their housing conditions; and
administrative proceedings in which tenants
who are denied Section 8 or other housing subsidies
contest those denials, or in which the recipients
of housing subsidies contest the terms
or termination of their subsidies;32
cases in which a homeowner’s ability to remain in his
home are at stake, including:
eviction proceedings brought by low-income
homeowners against tenants whose failure to
pay rent is placing at risk the landlord’s ability
to keep his home;33
counsel in such cases. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291(2), 297(4)(a) (McKinney 2008) (outlining
the procedure for securing counsel in a housing discrimination action).

31 Due process does not require public and semi-public housing providers to hold a hearing
for every applicant who is denied shelter. Sumpter v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 278
N.E.2d 892, 894 (N.Y. 1972). However, statutes or housing authority rules may provide for
hearings to be held. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(q)(2) (West 2007) (giving public housing
applicants the opportunity to dispute the accuracy or relevance of criminal record used to
deny housing); Frequently Asked Questions—City of Buffalo,
quentlyAskedQuestions (last visited Aug. 14, 2007) (informing rejected Buffalo Municipal
Housing Authority applicants of right to request an informal hearing with the Tenant Review

32 See, e.g., New York City Hous. Auth., Section 8 Tenant Questions, section8/ lh_ten_faqs.shtml (last visited Aug. 14,
2007) (notifying Section 8 recipients of their right to a hearing if denied recertification by
the housing authority).

33 An assigned counsel program run by the New York City Department for the Aging provides
attorneys to senior citizen landlords involved in such cases, as well as those defending
against eviction. The program does not have nearly enough funding to meet the need, how


proceedings to condemn a building;34
lawsuits or administrative proceedings in which homeless
people challenge the denial of emergency shelter,
seek improvement in the conditions of emergency
shelter, or challenge their removal from an emergency
shelter;35 and
cases in which involuntary residents of mental institutions,
drug treatment centers, prisons, juvenile detention
centers, foster care facilities or other government
institutions challenge the conditions in which they are
A. Current Scope of the Right
According to the ABA,

“Sustenance” includes a person or family’s sources of
income whether derived from employment, government
monetary payments or “in kind” benefits (e.g.,
food stamps). Typical legal proceedings involving
this basic human need include denials of or termination
of government payments or benefits, or low-wage

ever, and does not provide counsel as of right.

34 See generally N.Y. PUB. HOUS. LAW § 125 (McKinney 2008).

35 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 397.8 (2008). See also Project FAIR,
Fair Hearing Information, (last visited Aug.
14, 2007) (listing as a reason to seek an administrative fair hearing in New York City “[y]ou
have been denied emergency shelter”).

36 As noted above, people living in mental health facilities can receive legal services related
to their care and treatment from the Mental Hygiene Legal Service.


workers’ wage or employment disputes where counsel

is not realistically available through market forces.37

In New York State, there is a statutory right to counsel for unemployment
insurance claimants who have received a favorable decision
from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and are defending
that decision in an appeal brought by another party.38 The
fees in such cases, which are capped at the low rate of $500, are paid
by the state.39 Despite the statutory language, it appears that few attorneys
are rarely, if ever, appointed under this provision. The Department
of Labor does not mention the right to counsel on its webpage.

Respondents in child support proceedings who face incarceration
for willful failure to pay are also entitled to counsel.41

B. Potential for Expansion
At the “An Obvious Truth” conference in March 2008, participants
in a working group on the civil right to counsel in cases
concerning sustenance identified Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board proceedings as a prime candidate for an extension of the right
to counsel. In particular, they suggested that the existing right to
counsel for claimants who have received a favorable decision from
the Board and are defending that decision on appeal be extended to

37 ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 17, at 522.

38 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 538(1)(e) (McKinney 2008).

39 Id. § 538(1)(e)

40 See Department of Labor, The Hearing Process: Frequently Asked Questions,

41 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(vi) (McKinney 2008).


claimants who have received a favorable determination from an administrative
law judge and are defending against an appeal to the

Additionally, if the right to counsel in unemployment insurance
appeals is to be fully effectuated, the $500 fee cap must be
raised to a level that would provide attorneys with an incentive to
take the cases, and claimants must be informed of the right.

The executive directors of three New York civil legal aid programs
have identified child support proceedings as a category in need
of the right to counsel. Apart from respondents in such proceedings
who face potential incarceration for failure to pay, there is no right to
counsel in such cases.

With respect to cases involving sustenance, the ABA Resolution
pragmatically suggests focusing on a right to counsel in “lowwage
workers’ wage or employment disputes where counsel is not
realistically available through market forces.”42 Although there has
been some documentation of the difficulty low-wage workers face
finding attorneys to take their employment cases,43 there is a need for
research regarding what these cases are in New York. Possible candidates

42 ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A 13 (Aug. 7, 2006), available at sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf.

43 See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1574 n.88 (2005) (noting that various
“actual and potential costs should convince plaintiffs’ lawyers either to refuse to take, or not
to actively pursue, cases involving low-wage earners unless the employer’s liability is so
clear to the lawyer, the defense, and the court that punitive and compensatory damages are
available,” and concluding that “[t]his harsh reality results in the unlikelihood of low-wage
earners ever seeing the inside of a courtroom”); Sharon M. Dietrich, When Working Isn’t
Enough: Low-Wage Workers Struggle to Survive, 6 U. PENN. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 613, 623-24
(2004) (“Private attorneys seldom take the cases of low-wage workers, despite the availability
of attorneys’ fees under most employment law statutes, for a host of reasons . . . .”).


wage disputes in which the amount at issue is too low
to provide an incentive for attorneys to take the cases,
even though an attorneys’ fee award may be avail-
injunctive actions seeking reinstatement of an employee
or a change in the terms of the employees’ job
or working conditions; and
cases or administrative hearings challenge the termination
or denial of unemployment insurance and workers’
Additionally, suspension or revocation of a drivers’ license
may be tantamount to loss of employment, particularly for upstate rural
residents.45 Suspension may occur for criminal or civil reasons,
including nonpayment of child support, or an administrative determination
of physical or mental disability.46 There is, consequently, an
argument for providing a right to counsel in cases threatening suspension
or revocation. Indeed, in New Jersey the appointment of counsel
in such cases is required under the state constitution.47

The need for sustenance is also implicated in cases and administrative
hearings concerning denial, insufficiency or termination

44 See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 663(1), 681(1) (permitting maintenance of a civil action
against an employer who pays less than the statutory minimum wage, and permitting the recovery
of reasonable attorney’s fees).

45 Aaron J. Marcus, Are the Roads a Safer Place Because Drug Offenders Aren’t On
Them? An Analysis of Punishing Drug Offenders With License Suspension, 13 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 557, 570-73 (2004).

46 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 510.3.b, 510.4-e.

47 Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216 (N.J. 1971).


of government-funded subsistence benefits such as Food Stamps,
veterans assistance, emergency assistance for families with dependent
children and people with disabilities, and more.48

Cases Involving Child Custody
Current Scope of the Right
According to the ABA, “ ‘Child custody’ embraces proceedings
where the custody of a child is determined or the termination of
parental rights is threatened.”49 In New York State, the right to counsel
exists for individuals in the following categories of cases concerning
parental rights:

Respondents (including parents, foster parents, or any
other person having physical custody of the child)
have a right to counsel in child protective and child
abuse proceedings, including permanency proceedings
for children placed in foster care or freed for adoption.

Noncustodial parents and grandparents seeking visita48
See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22 (McKinney 2005) (providing for administrative hear

ings); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803(4) (McKinney 2003) (providing for Article 78 appeals).

49 ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 522.

50 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(i) (McKinney 2006) (referring to proceedings under Articles
10 and 10-A of the Family Court Act). See also Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1912 (2000).


tion of minors in foster care have a right to counsel.51

Respondents have a right to counsel in cases concerning
permanent termination of custody of minors.52
Parents, foster parents, or any other people having legal
or physical custody of child have a right to counsel
in proceedings concerning:
dependent children in foster care;53
guardianship and custody of children not in
foster care;54
guardianship and custody of destitute or dependent
children;55 and
foster care.56
Noncustodial parents or grandparents who have been
granted visitation rights with a child have a right to
counsel in cases where a government social services
agency is assuming custody of a child, and the agency
wants the ability to deny visitation to the parent or
Parents seeking child custody or contesting the infringement
of their right to custody have a right to
51 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(i) (referring to proceedings under part 8 of Article 10 of
the Family Court Act).

52 Id. § 262(a)(iii) (referring to proceedings under Article 6(3) of the Family Court Act).

53 Id. § 262(a)(iv) (referring to proceedings under § 358-a of the Social Services Law).

54 Id. § 262(a)(iv) (referring to proceedings under § 384 of the Social Services Law); N.Y.
SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 407.1(a)(ii) (McKinney 2008) (same).

55 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(iv) (referring to proceedings under § 384-b of the Social
Services Law).

56 Id. § 262(a)(iv) (referring to proceedings under § 392 of the Social Services Law).

57 Id. § 262(a)(iv) (referring to proceedings under § 384.2(e) of the Social Services Law).



Parents opposing adoption of their child have a right
to counsel.59
Respondents in paternity proceedings have a right to
Everyone listed above has the right to counsel in an
appeal of the action.61
When any of these cases is venued in Supreme Court, the parties
have the same right to counsel as they would if the case were venued
in Family Court.62

In some of these cases, the right to counsel stems from a constitutional
obligation recognized by the courts.63 In others, the right
to counsel stems from the legislature’s determination that providing
counsel is the right thing to do as a policy matter. In explaining the
motivation for legislating regarding the right to counsel in parental
rights cases, the Family Court Act states:

Persons involved in certain family court proceedings
may face the infringements of fundamental interests
and rights, including the loss of a child’s society and
the possibility of criminal charges, and therefore have

58 Id. § 262(a)(v); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 407.1(a)(iv). See also N.Y. JUD. LAW §
35(8) (McKinney 2007) (extending the right to counsel to Supreme Court cases, such as divorce
matters, where Family Court might have exercised jurisdiction).

59 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(vii); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 407.1(a)(iii).

60 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(viii).

61 Id. § 1120(a); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 407.1(a)(v) (same).

62 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(8).

63 See, e.g., In re Ella B., 285 N.E.2d 288, 291 (N.Y. 1972) (constitutional right to counsel
for indigent respondent parents in child protective proceedings); Jennings v. Jennings, 344
N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1973) (constitutional right to counsel for respondent
spouses in proceeding to enforce a support order because of the possibility of incarceration).


a constitutional right to counsel in such proceedings.
Counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization
of due process of law and may be helpful to the
court in making reasoned determinations of fact and
proper orders of disposition. The purpose of this part
is to provide a means for implementing the right to assigned
counsel for indigent persons in proceedings
under this act.64

Children have the right to a law guardian in abuse and neglect
proceedings, foster care placement and review proceedings, and person
in need of supervision cases.65 Judges also have discretion, but
not the obligation, to appoint a law guardian for children in custody,
visitation, and adoption proceedings.66

Until last year, the governing statute and caselaw were unclear
whether law guardians should advocate for their own view of
the child’s best interests, instead of acting as attorneys for the children,
and law guardians generally did the former.67 In October 2007,
however, Judge Kaye issued a new court rule making clear that law
guardians should act as an attorney for the child. The rule states: “In
juvenile delinquency and person in need of supervision proceedings,
where the child is the respondent, the attorney for the child must
zealously defend the child. In other types of proceedings, where the
child is the subject, the attorney for the child must zealously advocate

64 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 261 (McKinney 2008).
65 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform General Program, 42

U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249(a) (McKinney 2008); JULIA
14 (2000),
66 VITULLO-MARTIN & MAXEY, supra note 65, at 14.
67 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2003) (practice commentaries).


the child’s position.”68

2. Potential for Expansion
It might be appropriate to expand the mandatory right to
counsel for children to cases involving custody, visitation, and adoption.

Additionally, some legal services program directors have suggested
that the right to counsel in abuse and neglect cases should extend
to kincare providers, such as grandparents, seeking a voice in the
placement and treatment of children for whom they are caring.

B. Cases Involving Safety
1. Current Scope of the Right
According to the ABA, “ ‘Safety’ includes protection from
physical harm, such as proceedings to obtain or enforce restraining
orders because of alleged actual or threatened violence whether in the
domestic context or otherwise.”69 The right to counsel exists for individuals
in New York in the following categories of cases involving

Both parties have a right to counsel in proceedings in
Family Court resulting from acts of domestic violence,
including disorderly conduct, harassment, stalking,
menacing, reckless endangerment, and assault be68
N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 7.2 (Rules of the Chief Judge effective on Oct.
17, 2007).

69 ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 522.


tween members of the same family or household.70
The recent expansion of Family Court jurisdiction to
unmarried couples without children and to same-sex
couples seeking protection from domestic violence
means that they will receive the benefit of the right to
counsel, too.71

Children have the right to an attorney in abuse and neglect
Adults who, because of mental or physical impairments,
are allegedly unable to protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, or other hazardous situations, have a
right to counsel in any proceeding regarding involuntary
protective services from the State.73
Residents of mental health facilities are entitled to representation
by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service in a
legal action to protect them from abuse or mistreatment.
2. Potential for Expansion
By providing a right to counsel in the cases described above,
New York has recognized the importance of protecting physical

70 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(ii) (referring to proceedings under Article 8 of the Family
Court Act).
71 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §530.11 (McKinney 2008); Governor Signs “Fair Access to

Family Court” Law, THE SARATOGIAN, July 22, 2008.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 49-62.
73 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 473-a(5)(b) (McKinney 2008).
74 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.03(c) (McKinney 2008).


safety. However, even within these categories, the right is incomplete,
leaving some individuals unrepresented when their personal
safety is in jeopardy.

Although Mental Hygiene Legal Services provides counsel
for people challenging abuse or mistreatment in mental health institutions,
there is no right to counsel for people seeking protection from
abuse and mistreatment in other kinds of public institutions, such as
prisons, juvenile detention facilities, or homeless shelters.

While most safety issues related to immigration and deportation
are handled federally, at least one state has sought to protect the
safety of abused or neglected immigrant children by providing them
with counsel to petition for special immigrant juvenile status.75 New
York could consider providing a right to counsel in these or other
immigration proceedings where the safety of New York residents is

Finally, a right to counsel could be made available to plaintiffs
seeking injunctions to protect their safety from workplace hazards,
environmental dangers, or other hazards. A wide variety of tort
actions is available to people concerned with a nuisance, threat, or
ongoing harm in the workplace or in their homes.76 Although some

75 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(5) (West 2007).

76 There is no statutory basis for workplace safety litigation by private parties in New
York. Courts have not recognized a private right of action under either the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) or New York’s Public Employee Safety and
Health Act (“PESHA”). See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Rumsfeld, 321 F.3d
139, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding no private cause of action under OSHA); Hartnett v.
New York City Transit Auth., 657 N.E.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. 1995) (finding no private right of
action under PESHA). Although the Department of Labor does accept employee complaints
regarding workplace safety, a complaint typically results in an inspection of the workplace,
not an adversarial proceeding. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a(5) (McKinney 2008). Most New York
workers whose safety is threatened must therefore rely on common law actions to protect


of these provide for recovery of attorneys’ fee awards, New York
could provide a right to counsel for all cases in which counsel is not
realistically available despite a potential fee award.

A. Current Scope of the Right
According to the ABA, “ ‘Health’ includes access to appropriate
health care for treatment of significant health problems
whether that health care is financed by government (e.g., Medicare,
Medicaid, VA, etc.) or as an employee benefit, through private insurance,
or otherwise.”77 For people living in mental health care facilities,
New York’s Mental Hygiene Legal Service provides counsel in
cases involving treatment and care.78 There is no right to counsel for
any other New York residents seeking access to healthcare or a specific
medical procedure.

In describing health as an area of basic human need, the ABA
resolution focuses on the rights of individuals to obtain healthcare
and medical treatment.79 We discuss below in section V.A the right
to counsel for some individuals contesting mandatory medical treatment
or facing involuntary confinement for health reasons.

their personal safety in the workplace.

77 ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 522.

78 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.03(c) (McKinney 2008).

79 ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 522 (“ ‘Health’ includes
access to appropriate health care for treatment of significant health problems.”).


B. Potential for Expansion
In New York State in 2004, approximately 2.4 million people
lacked health insurance.80 Individuals asserting an entitlement to
health insurance coverage could benefit from a right to counsel as
they seek to meet their basic human need for healthcare. For example,
applicants for and recipients of veteran’s benefits, Medicaid, and
Medicare have a right to a fair hearing when these benefits are denied
or terminated, 81 and a right to appeal the hearing result in court.82
New York could help qualifying individuals obtain medical coverage
by providing a right to counsel in fair hearings and appeals from fair
hearings denying these benefits. Additionally, individuals may seek
to obtain or restore private health insurance benefits, such as those
guaranteed under an employment contract or a private insurance contract.
They may also benefit from a right to counsel when their basic
human need for healthcare has been unlawfully jeopardized.

For individuals who have public or private medical insurance
coverage, the right to healthcare is at stake in proceedings where
payment, treatment types, or other coverage specifics are disputed.83
The right to a fair hearing and appeal for people receiving veteran’s,
Medicare, or Medicaid benefits extends to situations where the
“amount or manner of payment” is inadequate.84 New York could
provide a right to counsel in fair hearings where individuals seek to

80 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Soc. and Econ. Supp., tbl.

HI06 (2005), available at

81 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008).

82 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803(4) (McKinney Supp. 2008).

83 People with private health insurance have a statutory right to file an external review
when their claims are denied. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4910 (McKinney Supp. 2008).

84 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(5)(c) (McKinney 2008).


obtain the full amount of their medical benefits, as well as in payment
and treatment disputes affecting privately insured individuals and
their basic human need for healthcare. In addition, New York law
provides special entitlements for people with certain medical conditions.
85 The State could consider providing a right to counsel for
people with those conditions seeking to obtain the treatment or benefits
guaranteed under law.

Finally, New York could extend the right to counsel for individuals
in mental health facilities to all residents of public institutions
seeking to meet their health needs. For example, prisoners in New
York are entitled to free medical and dental care from the State.86
There may be instances where an inmate needs representation to obtain
a medical service that the correctional facility did not deem necessary.
As another example, New York law currently allows for a
private right of action by patients of residential healthcare facilities,
including nursing homes, if they are injured as a result of being denied
a right or benefit to which they were entitled under statute, code,
regulation, or contract.87 New York may consider providing a right
to counsel in actions under this law, particularly when those actions
seek injunctive or declaratory relief which would have immediate effect
on a patient’s basic human need for healthcare. There could also

85 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2150 (McKinney 2008) (providing hospital care to
some patients with typhoid fever at the expense of the State); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2161
(McKinney 2008) (requiring counties, cities, and states to provide treatment to adult polio
patients “who cannot otherwise be provided for”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2202 (McKinney
2008) (requiring cities and counties to provide tuberculosis care and treatment); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2204 (McKinney 2008) (granting tuberculosis patients full transportation
expenses to state or country of residence at commissioner’s discretion).

86 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 500-h (McKinney 2008).

87 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d (McKinney 2008).


be a right to counsel for institutionalized individuals not covered by a
special statute who seek to obtain medical treatment or secure the environment
that best protects their health.

In New York State (as in the rest of the country), there is no
right to counsel across categories of cases for members of any special
or vulnerable population. Nonetheless, the fact that members of certain
groups may have a particular need for legal representation is well
recognized, as is evident from the many civil legal aid programs
dedicated to representing seniors, youths, and people with disabilities.
For this reason, it is worth considering whether certain categories
of litigants should have a broader right to counsel than members
of the general population do. Below is a discussion of the arguments
for carving out a right to counsel for some of possible categories.

People With Disabilities
In New York, people with mental disabilities have a right to
counsel in several categories of cases.88 For example, for people living
in mental health care facilities, New York’s Mental Hygiene Legal
Services provides counsel in cases involving treatment and care.89
Individuals who are the subject of a petition to appoint a guardian for
them on incapacity grounds receive representation from Mental Hy

88 In addition to the examples given here, other categories of such cases are discussed infra
Part VI.A.1.

89 See supra text accompanying note 22.


giene Legal Services.90

The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that mental disabilities
may make it impossible for a criminal defendant to represent himself,
stating: “ ‘[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and
concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common
symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant’s
ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-
representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.’
”91 These disabilities can make it equally impossible for a
civil litigant to proceed pro se. Nonetheless, apart from civil proceedings
concerning the treatment and care of people living in mental
health facilities, or concerning guardianship, the existence of a disability
precluding self-representation does not give rise to the right to
counsel in this state.

An article in the Seattle Journal for Social Justice argues that
for “people whose disabilities prevent them from understanding the
proceedings or vigorously participating in their cases, . . . the only
reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA, under the Rehabilitation
Act, and under state anti-discrimination statutes . . . is an
attorney.”92 The authors suggest that people with the following con

90 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10 (McKinney 2008) (requiring appointment of counsel
where alleged incapacitated person requests counsel, contests guardianship petition, requests
temporary guardian, or does not consent to move or major treatment requested in the petition,
or where court determines that appointment of counsel would be helpful). See also

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09 (McKinney 2008) (requiring appointment of a court
evaluator in all guardianship cases).
91 Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting Brief for APA et al. as
Amici Curiae at 26).
92 Lisa Brodoff et al., The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil
Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 609, 611 (2004).


ditions might fall into this category: those that “prevent a person from
comprehending what is happening in the courtroom or mustering a
case,” for example “mental retardation, dementia, schizophrenia, and
severe depression,” and also those that “sap energy or vitality to the
extent that a person is unable to participate meaningfully in court,”
including “[s]ome individuals with brain injuries, terminal illnesses,
Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, apraxia, and end-stage
alcoholism.”93 Likewise, participants in a New York County Lawyers’
Association conference focusing on the New York City Housing
Court concluded that a right to counsel in Housing Court “would
address and resolve many of the issues and problems presented and
faced by litigants with diminished capacity.”94

In September, 2007, Washington State became the first state
to explicitly provide by court rule that counsel may be appointed as a
reasonable accommodation for a litigant with a disability. The rule
requires each court in the state to accept requests for an accommodation,
to “make its decision on an individual- and case-specific basis
with due regard to the nature of the applicant’s disability and the feasibility
of the requested accommodation,” and to consider as an accommodation
“as to otherwise unrepresented parties to the proceedings,
representation by counsel, as appropriate or necessary to
making each service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety,
readily accessible to and usable by a qualified person with a
disability.” The rule does not, however, require the court to pay for

93 Id. at 610.

94 Conference Report: The New York City Housing Court in the 21st Century: Can It
Better Address the Problems Before It?, 3 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 601, 638


an attorney appointed pursuant to this rule.95

New York should consider adopting a version of this rule,
with several modifications.96 First, the rule would be more effective
if it were accompanied by funding for appointed counsel. Second, it
would make sense for New York to consider litigants with certain
types of disabilities categorically eligible for the appointment of
counsel. Finally, the rule should require courts to provide counsel for
eligible litigants who have a disability that is so obvious that court
personnel know or reasonably should know about it, even if the litigants
themselves do not request the appointment of counsel as an accommodation.

B. Children
As a general matter, minors are permitted to appear in court
only through a parent or other guardian. So long as a child has a
guardian representing his wishes, he may not have a greater need for
an attorney than any other litigant does.

However, when the child’s interests are at odds with those of
the guardian, when there is no guardian, or when the guardian is not
permitted to proceed pro se, there may be a need for court-appointed
counsel for the child.

As discussed above, New York guarantees children the right

95 Wash. Ct. R. Ann. G.R. 33 (2008).

96 On November 1, 2008, there was a vigorous discussion in the House of Delegates concerning
this recommendation. At that meeting, the President’s Committee on Access to Justice
agreed to consider whether the recommendation should be amended in any way, and to
report back to the House of Delegates at the January 2009 meeting of that body.

97 See Brady v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 06-5486, slip op. at 13 (July 2, 2008) (holding
that employers must provide accommodations for employees with a disability about which
the employer knows or reasonably should know).


to an attorney in abuse and neglect proceedings, foster care placement
and review proceedings, and person in need of supervision
cases.98 However, appointment of counsel for the child in custody,
visitation, and adoption proceedings is an expansion of the right to
counsel worth considering.99

Public school suspension and expulsion hearings pursuant to
Education Law § 3214 are another category of cases in which it may
be appropriate to provide a right to counsel, given the high importance
the state constitution places on the right to an education.100 Although
there does not appear to be a right to the appointment of
counsel in such cases in any other jurisdiction, in Colorado courts
have the discretion to appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for the

C. Seniors
As a group, seniors are more likely to have the sorts of physical
and mental disabilities that make it difficult for them to represent
themselves. Moreover, many are particularly vulnerable to exploitation
because they live in dire financial straits; rely for financial, emotional
and physical support on others; or live far from (or have no)
close family. For all of these reasons, many seniors have a particularly
pressing need for the appointment of counsel in categories of

98 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.

99 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.

100 See generally Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y.

101 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-105 (2006) (“[I]n all proceedings under the ‘School
Attendance Law of 1963,’ . . . the court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for the
child, unless the child is already represented by counsel.”).


cases concerning their basic human needs.

The only pending response to this set of concerns is the New
York City senior right to counsel bill described above, which would
create a right to counsel for low-income seniors facing eviction or
foreclosure. It is worth considering, however, whether there are other
types of cases in which the appointment of counsel for seniors is

D. Prisoners
Prisoners frequently face serious violations of their civil
rights, and even severe physical injury or death.102 Although criminal
defendants facing incarceration have a right to an attorney to defend
them against the criminal charges facing them, there is no right to
counsel for people in prison with serious legal needs, such as seeking
protection from mistreatment. On the contrary, prisoners have less
access to lawyers than do any other civil litigants. They cannot obtain
representation with respect to any civil matter from any civil legal
aid programs receiving Legal Services Corporation funding.103
The federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 reduces the attorneys’
fees that prisoners can obtain, substantially reducing the incentive
for attorneys in private practice to represent prisoners in prison


JUVENILE PRISONS FOR GIRLS (2006), available at

103 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 1637 (2007).


conditions cases.104 And without a lawyer the fact of their incarceration
may make it impossible for them to conduct factual investigation,
discovery or legal research, or even to appear in court instead of
on a video screen. There is, consequently, an argument for a right to
counsel for prisoners attempting to protect themselves from mistreatment.

Like prisoners, many immigrants in immigration detention
have no way of participating in court proceedings in any meaningful
way without a lawyer. Language barriers, and a lack of familiarity
with the U.S. legal system create additional hurdles. Consequently,
some advocates have argued that there should be a right to counsel
for immigrants in detention, or at least for those who are children.105

The Right to Counsel in Cases InvolvingDeprivation of Physical Liberty
Current Scope of the Right
In In re Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles facing
juvenile detention have a right to counsel.106 In Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, the Court intimated that the right extends

104 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2003).

105 See, e.g., Sharon Finkel, Voice of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through Appointed
Counsel for Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1105 (2001).

106 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).


to all cases in which “the defendant’s interest in personal freedom” is
at stake.107 Following these mandates, New York explicitly provides
for a right to counsel for individuals in the following categories of
proceedings which threaten an individual’s liberty:

Individuals have a right to counsel when facing or
challenging involuntary commitment or hospitalization
because of mental illness,108 sex offender status,109
or communicable disease,110 or because they are allegedly
unable to manage their own resources, carry out
the activities of daily living, or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or other
hazardous situations.111
Individuals have a right to counsel when facing mandatory
outpatient treatment or programming for mental
People defending against an attempt to hold them in
contempt of court or willful violation of a court order
452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1981).

108 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.27(f), 939(a)(2); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 402(3) (McKinney
2008). See also People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 217 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1966) (“[A]n
indigent mental patient, who is committed to an institution, is entitled, in a habeas corpus
proceeding (brought to establish his sanity), to the assignment of counsel as a matter of constitutional

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.08(g) (McKinney 2008).

110 Rapoport v. G.M., 657 N.Y.S.2d 748-49 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997) (“In a proceeding
pursuant to Public Health Law § 2120 to involuntarily hospitalize a person [who has a communicable
disease and who cannot or will not refrain from infecting others] there exists a
constitutional right to counsel because the outcome of the proceeding may result in that person’s
losing his or her physical liberty.”).

N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 473-a (5)(b) (McKinney 2008).

112 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2008) (“The subject of the petition shall
have the right to be represented by the mental hygiene legal service, or privately financed
counsel, at all stages of a proceeding commenced under this section.”).


have a right to counsel (except in summary proceedings,
i.e. those punishing contempt committed in front
of a judge), and in proceedings in Supreme Court
where the right to counsel would exist were the case
venued in Family Court. There is, however, no right
to counsel in summary contempt proceedings (i.e.
those punishing contempt committed in front of a

Judges in other civil courts have a constitutional obligation
to appoint counsel in any civil contempt proceedings
that may result in incarceration.114 Pursuant
to statute, judges in those courts have discretion to appoint
counsel to people facing any other form of punishment
or commitment for civil contempt.115
Children have the right to either self-selected counsel
or a court-appointed attorney in juvenile delinquency
proceedings; this right cannot be waived.116
An individual has a right to counsel in a state habeas
corpus proceeding challenging a criminal conviction,
where the petition is not neither “baseless” nor “repeti113
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(vi); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(8).

114 See, e.g., Ullah v. Entezari-Ullah, 836 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007);
Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of N.Y. v. Lamison, 462 N.Y.S.2d 109, 111 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.

115 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 770 (McKinney 2008) (“[T]he court shall inform the offender that he
or she has the right to the assistance of counsel, and when it appears that the offender is financially
unable to obtain counsel, the court may in its discretion assign counsel to represent
him or her.”)

116 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249(a) (McKinney 2008); VITULLO-MARTIN & MAXEY, supra
note 65, at 14.



2. Potential for Expansion
While statutory law guarantees a person counsel in all contempt
proceedings (other than summary contempt) in Family Court,
there is only a discretionary right to counsel under statute in civil
contempt cases in other courts where incarceration is not an option.118
New York could extend the right to counsel to all civil contempt proceedings
in all courts.

Presently, constitutional caselaw exempts current prisoners
from the right to counsel in cases that affect their liberty. Procedural
due process doctrine distinguishes between people who have lost a
right or privilege and those who did not have that right in the first
place. Because people in prison are already deprived of their liberty,
courts have found no constitutional right to counsel when they face
additional punishment or extended imprisonment.119 Under a current
New York statute, for example, an inmate facing disciplinary charges
can select a prison employee to represent him in some cases, but has
no right to actual legal counsel.120 Similarly, prisoners seeking parole

117 People ex rel. Williams v. LaVallee, 225 N.E.2d 735, 736 (N.Y. 1967).

118 Compare N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(vi), with N.Y. JUD. LAW § 770.

119 See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The type of interest
protected by procedural due process, however, is usually one presently enjoyed . . . . Appellant,
however, does not presently enjoy freedom of movement beyond the prison walls.”)
120 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 251-4.1 (2007) (guaranteeing an employee
assistant to inmates who are illiterate, non-English speaking, sensorially disabled, awaiting
superintendent’s hearing, or charged with drug use as a result of urinalysis, and providing
“absolute discretion” to hearing officers to allow employee assistance for other inmates).
See also Silva v. Casey, 992 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The assistant is not obliged to go
beyond the specific instructions of the inmate because if he did so he would then be acting as


do not have a right to counsel, 121 and paroled individuals have only a
qualified right to counsel in a hearing to revoke parole or probation.

B. The Right to Counsel in Other Types of Cases
Although there is a right to counsel in the child custody portion
of matrimonial proceedings to the extent that right would exist
were the case in Family Court, there is no right to counsel in the portion
of matrimonial cases adjudicating whether a couple should be
divorced, or what the distribution of their assets should be. In Orange,
Putnam, and Westchester counties, the courts, with assistance
from Legal Services of the Hudson Valley and Putnam Legal Aid Society,
operate an assigned counsel program in matrimonial cases.123
The attorneys who are assigned are not paid but can apply for a fee
award if one is available. In response to our survey, one executive
director of a civil legal aid organization identified divorce proceedings
as being in need of a right to counsel.

counsel in a prison disciplinary proceeding, assistance to which a prisoner is not entitled.”).
121 McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2000) (New York state prisoner not enti

tled to counsel in parole eligibility hearing).
122 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.